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Summary 
This thesis presents Belief Augmented Frames, or BAFs. A BAF represents a concept 
or item in the world, and slot-value pairs represent relations between BAFs. Each BAF 
is assigned two belief masses. The Supporting Mass represents the degree in which the 
evidence supports the existence of the concept or object represented by the BAF. The 
Refuting Mass represents the degree in which the evidence refutes the existence of the 
concept or object. Likewise Supporting and Refuting Belief Masses are also defined on 
slot-value pairs to support and refute the relationships between BAFs. The novelty of 
BAFs comes from the independence between the Supporting and Refuting masses, 
thus giving us great flexibility in modeling arguments for and against a fact. This thesis 
suggests several sources for both masses. A logic system called BAF-Logic based on 
fuzzy-logic style min-max functions and Predicate Logic is also introduced to perform 
reasoning on BAF and their relations. Rigorous proofs are presented to show that the 
rules of Predicate Logic hold under BAF-Logic. Thus BAFs enrich Predicate Logic by 
adding structures and events, while at the same time retaining the powerful reasoning 
abilities of Predicate Logic. This thesis then shows how “fuzzy” terms like “helpful” 
and “tall”, together with linguistic hedges like “very” and “somewhat” may be 
represented by BAFs. An example discourse understanding example is presented. A 
second larger and more practical application of BAFs to text classification is also 
presented. A comparison study with the traditional Naïve Bayes and the competing 
Probabilistic Argumentation System models is made and analyzed, and results are 
presented in this thesis. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction and Problem Statement 
Our research deals with the evaluation and integration of uncertain and defeasible 
structured knowledge. In this chapter we briefly introduce the concepts that will be 
explored later on in much greater detail, and we define the objective and scope of this 
research. We close this chapter with the layout for the remainder of this thesis. 
1.1 Introduction 
The knowledge base is a key component in any intelligent system, and many methods 
and formalisms have been devised to maintain the consistency of the knowledge base 
and to examine the truth of a new proposition.  
In monotonic reasoning systems, facts in the Knowledge Base are assumed to be 
correct, and while they are used to evaluate new propositions, the facts themselves 
remain unchanged once they are asserted in the system.  
This is a questionable assumption as the “facts” are often based on the judgment of 
knowledge engineers. Contradictions may appear in the data, and these may be more 
accurate than the existing knowledge in the knowledge base. 
In non-monotonic reasoning existing knowledge is assumed to be possibly faulty and 
when new facts are produced that contradict this knowledge, it is updated accordingly. 
An assumed fact may even be completely contradicted and removed from the 
knowledge base. There is thus less need for the knowledge to be complete and 
accurate. 
Reasoning systems based on two-valued logic face yet another problem; conclusions in 
Propositional and First-Order Logic are discrete and binary.  A conclusion is always 
either strictly true, or strictly false, with no degrees of truth and falsehood in between.   
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This clearly does not fit the real world. For example, the statement “the boy is fat” is 
vague. How “fat” is “fat”? Would a boy who is considered “fat” by person A 
necessarily be considered “fat” by person B? In the real world truth is a spectrum of 
values rather than the two binary values of  “true” and “false”.  
Statistical methods may address these problems but assume that an event will either 
occur, or it will not. It will either be true, or it will be false. Statistical methods leave 
no room for ignorance, and this can lead to difficulties [Short85] 
“Belief measures” have been introduced to address these difficulties with classical 
statistics. In such reasoning systems our belief in a fact may be revised when new 
evidence becomes available, and ignorance and contradictions are handled naturally 
and easily. 
1.2 Objectives Of This Research 
The primary objective of this research is to study how uncertain and defeasible 
structured knowledge gained from discourse and other sources may be integrated into a 
knowledge base.   
There are several things to consider when integrating new knowledge: 
i) How reliable is this new knowledge? 
ii) How to combine this new knowledge with existing knowledge? 
iii) What other new information can we infer from the new knowledge just 
integrated? 
iv) How does integrating this new knowledge affect our overall “level of 
knowledge”, or conversely how does it affect our “level of ignorance”? 
The main deliverable of this research would therefore be a system of theories and 
techniques that allow us to integrate new knowledge that we have gained, and to use 
this new knowledge to make better inferences and conclusions. 
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1.3 Layout of This Thesis 
We begin with a review of reasoning systems in Chapter 2. We will look at classical 
reasoning systems like Propositional and First Order Logic systems. We will proceed 
to show why these systems are unsatisfactory for modeling real world knowledge. We 
then go on with a survey of multi-valued logic systems, fuzzy logic and certainty 
factors. We end this chapter by exploring two key belief systems – Dempster-Shafer 
Theory and Probabilistic Argumentation Systems. 
In Chapter 3 we introduce Belief Augmented Frames, or BAFs. BAFs are basic AI 
frames that have been enhanced with two belief masses; one mass to support the 
existence of a frame or relation, and one mass to refute it. The two masses are 
completely independent of each other, and their values may come from different 
sources. This gives us great flexibility in modeling the arguments for and against a 
particular fact. We will also show that our rules for combining belief measures is 
logically sound. 
We then introduce a reasoning system called BAF-Logic to perform non-monotonic 
reasoning on these belief masses. We show rigorously that BAF-Logic is a 
conditionally sound reasoning system that obeys all the rules of reasoning as defined in 
simple two-valued logic systems. We will also explore the conditions under which 
BAF-Logic may produce invalid conclusions and suggest solutions to deal with this. 
In Chapter 4 we apply BAFs to discourse understanding, including how BAF belief 
masses may be used to model fuzzy linguistic words like “tall” and linguistic hedges 
like “very”. We conclude this chapter with a toy problem to demonstrate the concepts 
introduced. 
In Chapter 5 we apply BAFs and BAF-Logic to the text classification problem. We 
will show how a document may be modeled in BAF-Logic, and we evaluate the 
Introduction and Problem Statement 
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performance of our system against classical Naïve Bayes approaches and a third 
approach using Probabilistic Argumentation Systems (PAS). 
Finally in Chapter 6 we wrap up this thesis with a review and summary of the earlier 
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Chapter 2 Multivalued and Uncertain Reasoning Systems 
We begin this chapter with a look at two-valued logic systems, and why they are 
generally unsuitable for modeling the real world. We then go on with a survey of 
multi-valued logic systems, and we present a detailed coverage of six major multi-
valued belief systems – Lukasiewicz Logic, Fuzzy Logic, Certainty Factors, and belief 
systems like Dempster-Shafer Theory, Transferable Belief Models and Probabilistic 
Argumentation Systems that model belief as a range of values. We conclude this 
chapter with justification for a new framework called Belief Augmented Frames, with 
its underlying reasoning system called BAF-Logic. 
While statistical models like Bayesian belief networks and Markov chains are 
important in uncertain reasoning, we have left out this family of systems as they are 
unable to model ignorance. In these models a fact P is either true with a probability of 
p(P), or untrue with a probability of 1 – p(P). These methods do not take into account 
the possibility that we are unsure of the truth of P. There is a wealth of literature 
available on statistical models and methods, and the reader is referred to any of these.  
2.1 Two-Valued Logic Systems 
In this section we review the concepts behind the two main systems of two-valued 
logic: Propositional and Predicate (or First Order) Logic. For a complete treatment of 
two-valued logic, see [Galton90], [Giarratano94] or any AI textbook. 
2.1.1 Propositional Logic 
Formally, a Propositional Logic system is defined by a set of symbols P representing 
facts, and a set of connectives C = {∧, ∨, ¬, →}, representing conjunction, disjunction, 
An Introduction to Belief Augmented Frames 
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negation and implication respectively. It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the 
semantics of each connective. 
A set of inference rules or axioms is defined to allow the logic to infer new knowledge 
from the existing knowledge. The rules are summarized in Table 2.1. The value 
FALSE is represented in this table as ⊥, while TRUE is represented by T. 
Rule Name Premises Conclusion 
∧-Introduction P, Q P ∧ Q 
∧-Elimination P, P∧Q  Q 
∨-Introduction P  P ∨ Q  
∨-Elimination P ∨ Q, ¬Q P  
Modus Ponens P,  P→Q Q 
Modus Tollens (P→Q) ∧ ¬Q  P  
Distributivity P ∧ (Q ∨ R)  (P ∧  Q) ∨ (P ∧ R)  
Distributivity P∨ (Q ∧  R)  (P ∨   Q) ∧ (P ∨ R) 
Contradiction P ∧ ¬P ⊥ 
Tautology P ∨ ¬P  T 
Associativity over ∧ (P ∧ Q) ∧ R P ∧ (Q ∧ R) 
Associativity over ∨ (P ∨Q) ∨ R P ∨ (Q ∨ R) 
Commutativity over ∧ P ∧ Q Q ∧ P 
Commutativity over ∨ P ∨ Q  Q ∨ P 
De-Morgan’s Theorem ¬(P ∧  Q) ¬P∨¬ Q  
De-Morgan’s Theorem ¬ (P ∨   Q) ¬P∧ ¬ Q 
→-Elimination P → Q ¬ P ∨ Q 
Resolution (P ∨ Q) ∧  (¬ P ∨ R) Q ∨ R 
Table 2.1 Inference Rules in Propositional Logic 
 
Propositional logic is both complete and sound [Galton90]. The inference rules allow 
us to validate a hypothesis, given the knowledge base KB. A hypothesis R is valid if, 
given KB, there is a sequence of applications of the rules in Table 2.1 that eventually 
produce R.  As an example, suppose the symbols P, Q and R represent:  
P: Socrates is a man 
Q: Socrates is mortal 
R: Socrates will die 
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We define the rules: 
P → Q: If Socrates is a man, he is mortal. 
Q→ R: If Socrates is mortal, he will die. 





 Q Modus Ponens 
 






 R Modus Ponens 
 
Since we know that Socrates is mortal, and since we know that if Socrates is a mortal, 
he will die, we conclude that Socrates will eventually die. 
Repeated application of the rules of inference will indeed allow us to derive a 
conclusion R if KB entails R. However this is not a practical method if the number of 
entries in the knowledge base KB is large. Fortunately we can apply resolution to test 
the validity of a hypothesis. Returning to our example on Socrates, we first render all 
the propositions into disjunctive forms: 
  P → Q = ¬ P ∨ Q → - elimination  
  Q → R = ¬ Q∨ R → - elimination  
Our complete knowledge base KB is now 
  {¬ P ∨ Q, ¬ Q∨ R, P}  
 
At this point we want to prove that Socrates will die (i.e. we want to prove hypothesis 
R). To perform resolution, we invert the goal R: 
  ¬ R  
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Applying the facts in our knowledge base and the resolution rule, we can derive: 
¬ P ∨ Q






Figure 2.1 Resolution Tree 
From the resolution tree in Figure 2.1, we can see that the inverted hypothesis results 
in a contradiction (indicated by the symbol ⊥) . Thus since the inverted hypothesis 
leads to a contradiction, we infer that the original hypothesis R is correct. 
Resolution is a simple technique that is amenable to programming, making it a highly 
popular inference mechanism.  
Model checking is another method for testing the validity of an inference. To perform 
model checking, we test every possible value of P, Q and R. First we assign A and B to 
mean: 
  A = ¬ P ∨ Q 
  B = ¬ Q ∨ R 
P Q R A = ¬P ∨ Q B = ¬Q ∨ R P ∧ A ∧ B 
F F F T T F 
F F T T T F 
F T F T F F 
F T T T T F 
T F F F T F 
T F T F T F 
T T F T F F 
T T T T T T 
Table 2.2 Model Checking 
From Table 2.2, we see that whenever P ∧ A ∧ B is true (i.e., P, ¬P ∨ Q and ¬Q ∨ R 
are all true), then R is also true. So our knowledge base {P, ¬P ∨ Q, ¬Q ∨ R} entails 
the conclusion R. As expected, this occurs when P, Q and R are all true. 
Belief Augmented Frames 
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2.1.2 Predicate Logic 
Propositional logic provides us with a rigorous system for proving the validity of a 
hypothesis. Unfortunately for us we are unable to generalize a rule in Propositional 
Logic to all members of a class. As an example, suppose we wanted to verify if Fred 
would some day die. Our current rules are: 
  if Socrates is a man then Socrates is mortal 
  if Socrates is mortal then he will die 
Unfortunately this does not tell us anything about Fred. To test Fred’s mortality, we 
need to define new rules: 
  if Fred is a man then Fred is mortal 
if Fred is mortal then he will die 
We will now be able to use these rules to determine if Fred will die. If Alice comes 
along, we have to define more rules: 
  if Alice is a man then Alice is mortal 
  if Alice is mortal then Alice will die 
As our population surpasses 6,000,000,000 people this is clearly not a satisfactory 
solution. What we need instead is a rule that says: 
  if X is a man then X is mortal 
  if X is mortal then X will die 
We can then assign X=Socrates, X=Fred, X=Alice or even X=Ted and then we’d be 
able to validate if the person or thing in question will some day die. This is the primary 
aim of Predicate Logic. Predicate Logic introduces two new symbols ∀ (read as “for 
every”) and ∃ (read as “there exists”), with the following meanings: 
  ∀x P(x) For all members of our world, the fact P(x) is true. 
An Introduction to Belief Augmented Frames 
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  ∃xP(x)  There is at least one member in our world such that the  
fact P(x) is true. 
Our examples show a third concept: predicates. A predicate asserts a fact about a 
member (or a group of members, as in the above cases) in our world. Returning to our 
mortality problem: 
  man(Socrates). 
  ball(Fred). 
  dog(Alice). 
These facts state that Socrates is a man, Fred is a ball, and Alice is a dog. Our rules 
may now be re-written as: 
  ∀x man(x) → mortal(x) 
  ∀y mortal(y) → die(y) 
Where mortal(x) means that x is mortal, and die(y) means that y will some day die. 
Suppose our knowledge base contains the fact man(Socrates). To test if Socrates will 
some day die, we need to substitute Socrates for X. This is done through a process 
called unification.  
The substitution instance θ = {x/Socrates} defines the substitutions necessary to make 
our inferences. This gives us: 
  man(Socrates) → mortal(Socrates) 
We have now inferred that Socrates is a man. Substituting θ = {y/Socrates} gives us: 
  mortal(Socrates) → die(Socrates) 
We are now able to conclude that Socrates will one day die. 
Resolution may also be applied in Predicate Logic. Again converting to disjunctive 
forms: 
Belief Augmented Frames 
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  ∀x ( ¬ man(x) ∨ mortal(x)) 
  ∀y ( ¬ mortal(y) ∨ die(y)) 
  man(Socrates) 
We assert the negation of what we want to proof: 
  ¬ die(Socrates) 











   Figure 2.2 Resolution Tree in Predicate Logic 
 
This resolution tree, on the surface, looks very much like the one in Figure 2.1. It is, 
however, much more expressive: Instead of having a similar but different set of rule 
for Socrates, Fred, Alice or even Fifi, we have just a single set of rules. Note also that 
the substitution instances {x/Socrates} and {y/Socrates} are shown in the resolution 
tree. 
2.1.3 Discussion 
Two-valued logic is valuable for proving theorems that are either strictly true or 
strictly false. In our example above, we began with the axioms that anyone who is  a 
man is mortal, and that anyone who is mortal will one day die. From this we derived 
the theorem that Socrates will one day die. Many algorithms have also been proposed 
to efficiently compute truth values and to derive new theorems, and a large number of 
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reasoning engines and expert systems have been built around these well established 
theories and algorithms. 
Unfortunately much of the real world cannot be represented as “true” or “false”. For 
example, if Fred weighs 90 kilograms, is Fred fat? He’d probably be considered fat if 
he was only 1.3 meters tall, but if he was 2.3 meters tall he’d certainly be considered 
skinny. What about heights in between? Is he a little fat? Somewhat fat? A little 
skinny? Somewhat skinny? 
We could possibly set a hard threshold and say that if Fred was less than 1.9 meters 
tall, he’d be considered fat, and if he’s above that height, then he’s not fat. This is still 
unsatisfactory. On what basis did we choose 1.9 meters as the threshold? Should 
someone 1.9 meters tall considered to be skinny while someone 1.8999 meters be 
considered fat?  
Quite clearly two-valued logic cannot satisfactorily represent Fred’s weight condition. 
For this, we need to rely on multi-valued logic.  
2.2 Multivalued Logic 
Multivalued logic (MVL) is a class of logic systems that are designed to deal with an 
“analog” world where the truth or falsehood of a fact falls on a range or set of values 
rather than on two distinct, discrete values. In this section we look at several multi-
valued logic systems including Lukasiewicz N-valued, fuzzy and modal logic systems.  
2.2.1 N-Valued Lukasiewicz Logic 
N-valued logic was first proposed by Lukasiewicz in 1930. A common instance of 
Lukasiewicz logic is trivalue logic, where the truth-values of True, False and Unsure 
are represented by 0, 1 and ½ respectively. In general, the set of n truth values is 
assumed to be evenly divided over the interval [0, 1]: 







For example, T2 = {0, 1}, T3 = {0, ½, 1}, T4 = {0, ¼, ½, 1} etc. In T4, we could define 
truth values False, Possibly False, Possibly True and True as 0, ¼, ½, and 1 
respectively. Lukasiewicz defined the following operators: 
 ¬ x = 1 – x (2.2a)
 x ∧ y = min(x, y) (2.2b)
 x ∨ y = max(x, y) (2.2c)
 x → y = min(1, 1 + y – x) (2.2d)
 
An N-valued logic is denoted by LN. As an example, consider the following statements 
in L4 logic: 
  P: Fred is possibly fat. P = 0.75 
  Q: Fred is possibly not unhealthy. Q = 0.5 
Let R be the theorem that Fred is fat and unhealthy: 
  R  = P ∧ Q 
   = min(0.5, 0.75) 
   = 0.5 
Thus it is possibly true that Fred is both unhealthy and fat. Note that N-valued logic is 
an exact logic; we can conclude that a theorem is exactly false, exactly “possibly 
false”, exactly “possibly true” or exactly true. There are no intermediate truth values 
between these. 
2.2.2 Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic was first proposed by Lofti Zadeh [Zadeh65], [Zadeh73], [Zadeh81] and 
may be viewed as and extension of N-Valued logic. Unlike N-Valued logic, however, 
fuzzy logic belongs to the class of logic systems called “approximate reasoning”. 
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Approximate reasoning does not give exact values. Neither does it depend solely on 
guess-work.  
Fuzzy logic operators are based on Lukasiewicz operators: 
 ¬ x(A) = 1 – µA(x) (2.3a)
 x(A) ∧ y(A) = min(µA(x), µA(y)) (2.3b)
 x(A) ∨ y(A) = max(µA(x), µA(y)) (2.3c)
 x(A) → y(A) = max(1- µA(x), µA(y)) (2.3d)
 
The notation x(A)is read as “x is A”, and its numeric truth value is given by the 
membership function µA(x). Coming back to our friend Fred, suppose we defined the 
membership function  µfat(.) as: 
Weight (kg) Membership Function 
[0, 40) 0.0 
[40, 45) 0.1 
[45, 50) 0.2 
[50, 55) 0.3 
[55, 60) 0.4 
[60, 65) 0.5 
[65, 70) 0.6 
[70, 75) 0.7 
[75, 80) 0.8 
[80, 85) 0.9 
[85, inf) 1.0 
Table 2.3 Membership Function µFat(x)    
Additionally we define the membership function µTall as: 
Height (m) Membership Function 
[0, 1.3) 0.0 
[1.3, 1.5) 0.2 
[1.5, 1.7) 0.4 
[1.7, 1.9) 0.6 
[2.0, 2.2) 0.8 
[2.2, inf) 1.0 
Table 2.4 Membership Function µTall(x) 
Given that Fred is 1.75 meters tall and weights 77 kg, we have the membership grades 
µFat(77) = 0.7 and µTall(1.75) = 0.6. From here we can determine the truth of the 
statement: 
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 If X is tall, then X is fat: 
  µ Tall → Fat  = max(1 - µTall(1.75), µFat(77)) 
    = max(0.3, 0.6) 
    = 0.6 
Hence for Fred at least, we have a truth value of 0.6 that if one is tall, then one is also 
fat. 
Here µFat(x) and µTall(x) are defined as discrete functions, though they don’t have to be. 
Membership functions in fuzzy logic are often defined in terms of the S-function, 
which provides a piece-wise continuous set of membership values, or Π-functions, 
which provide membership values based on proximity to a central value. 
The main strength of fuzzy logic lies in its ability to model linguistic hedges like very, 
more or less etc. Table 2.5 defines these hedges using fuzzy-logic operators: 
Linguistic Hedge Definition 
Very F F2 
More or less F F0.5 
Plus F F1.5 
Not F 1 – F 
Not very F 1 – F2 
Table 2.5 Linguistic Hedges 
Thus our membership values for very fat and not very tall would be: 
Weight (kg) Membership Function µFat(x)2 
[0, 40) 0.0 
[40, 45) 0.01 
[45, 50) 0.04 
[50, 55) 0.09 
[55, 60) 0.16 
[60, 65) 0.25 
[65, 70) 0.36 
[70, 75) 0.49 
[75, 80) 0.64 
[80, 85) 0.81 
[85, inf) 1.0 
Table 2.6 Membership function µvery_fat(x) 
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Height (m) Membership Function 1 – µTall(x)2 
[0, 1.3) 1.0 
[1.3, 1.5) 0.96 
[1.5, 1.7) 0.84 
[1.7, 1.9) 0.64 
[2.0, 2.2) 0.36 
[2.2, inf) 0.0 
Table 2.7 Membership function µnot_very_tall(x) 
The truth value for if Fred is very fat then he is not very tall may be evaluated as 
  µ very_fat→ not_very_tall = max(1 – µvery_fat(77), µnot_very_tall(1.77)) 
    = max(1 – 0.64, 0.64) 
    = max(0.36, 0.64) 
    = 0.64 
Fuzzy logic is often defined in terms of fuzzy sets. A fuzzy set is one where the 
membership of an entity in a set is not absolute (i.e. 1.0), but is given by its 
membership value. Hence for the fuzzy set A with 3 members a, b  and c: 
A = {µA(a)/a + µA(b)/b + µA(c)/c} 
The ‘/’ separates a member from its score, while ‘+’ is a set union rather than an 
arithmetic addition. Fuzzy logic provides its own equivalent set union, intersection and 
difference functions, and a set of other functions that are unique to fuzzy sets, like 
concentration (F2) which we used to express very F, dilation (F0.5), which we used to 
express “more or less F” and intensification. Hypotheses are evaluated with the min-
max composition principle. The max-min composition principle states that in a case 
where: 
  if E11 and E12 then H1 
if E21 and E22 then H2 
if E31 and E32 then H3 
if E41 and E42 then H4 
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Where each Eij is some fuzzy expression. Given that H = H1 ∨ H2 ∨ H3 ∨ H4, then the 
overall truth value for H is: 
  µH = max(min(E11, E12), min(E21, E22), min(E31, E32), min(E41, E42)) 
Suppose then that Eij define the following fuzzy sets: 
  E11 = {0.3/a + 0.2/b + 0.5/c} 
  E12 = {0.1/a + 0.6/b} 
  E21 = {0.2/b + 0.7/c} 
  E22 = {0.1/a + 0.9/b + 0.7/c} 
  E31 = {0.6/a + 0.1/b + 0.4/c} 
  E32 = {0.9/a + 0.7/b + 0.2/c} 
  E41 = {0.3/c} 
  E42 = {0.2/a + 0.1/b} 
Then we have:  
min(E11, E12) = {0.1/a + 0.2/b} 
min(E21, E22) = {0.2/b + 0.7/c} 
min(E31, E32) = {0.6/a + 0.1/b + 0.2/c} 
min(E41, E42) = { } 
From here, we take the maximum of all four minimums and we get: 
  H = {0.6/a + 0.2/b + 0.7/c} 
So our final hypothesis is H = {0.6/a + 0.2/b + 0.7/c}. Zadeh [Zadeh79] also defines a 
set “translation rules” to determine how to compose elementary set operations to 
produce more sophisticated operations. As an example, Type II composition rules 
control how to translate statements like If X is TALL then Y is SHORT.  
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2.2.3 Certainty Factors 
Certainty Factors were used in the medical diagnostic system MYCIN [Adams85], and 
are a way of computing uncertainty in a rule, leading to the decision on whether to fire 
the rule. 









where CF is the certainty factor in the hypothesis H due to the evidence E, MB is the 
measure of increased belief in H due to E, and MD is the measure of increased 
disbelief in H due to E. 
Both MB and MD are measured in terms of probabilities: 
 MB(H, E) = 1                                                          if P(H) = 1 










MD(H,E) = 1                                                          if P(H) = 0 






−             otherwise 
 
(2.6)
Table 2.8 summarizes the characteristics of CF: 
Characteristic Values 
Ranges 0 ≤ MB, MD ≤ 1 
-1 ≤ CF ≤ 1 
Certainly True, P(H|E) = 1 MB = 1 
MD = 0 
CF = 1 
Certainly False, P(H’|E) = 1 MB = 0 
MD = 1 
CF = -1 
Lack of evidence P(H|E) = P(H) MB = 0 
MD = 0 
CF = 0 
Table 2.8 CF Characteristics 
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Rules are defined to compute the certainty factor of logical expressions: 
Evidence E Certainty 
E = E1 ∧ E2 min(CF(H, E1), CF(H, E2)) 
E = E1 ∨ E2 max(CF(H, E1), CF(H, E2)) 
E = ¬ E1 - CF(H, E1) 
Table 2.9 CF Rules of Combination 
For example, given the expression E = (E1 ∧ E2) ∨ ¬ E3, given the following values: 
 E1 = 0.3 
 E2 = 0.5 
 E3  = 0.7 
The certainty is max(min(E1, E2), -E3) 
  = max(min(0.3, 0.5), -0.7) 
  = 0.3 
Given a hypothesis H with antecedent evidence E the certainty factor of a rule: 
   If E then H 
is given by: 
 CF(H,e) = CF(E,e) CF(H, E) (2.7)
 
Where CF(E,e) is the certainty factor of the evidence E based on uncertain evidence e, 
CF(H,e) is the certainty factor of a hypothesis H based on uncertain evidence e, and 
CF(H, E) is the certainty factor of the hypothesis. 
Suppose we had the rule: 
  If E1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3 then H1 with certainty 0.7 
Then CF(H, E) = 0.7, where E is the combination of evidence E1, E2 and E3. 
Suppose we have: 
  CF(E1, e) = 0.5 
  CF(E2, e) = 0.6 
  CF(E3, e) = 0.3 
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Then using the rules of combination in Table 2.9: 
  CF(E, e) = min(CF(E1, e), CF(E2, e), CF(E3, e)) 
   = min(0.5, 0.6, 0.3) 
   = 0.3 
The certainty factor CF(H, e) given by equation 2.7 is now: 
  CF(H, e) = CF(E, e) CF(H, E) 
   = 0.3 X 0.7 
   = 0.21 
If this is sufficiently high, then the rule given will fire. 
If there are several rules pointing to the same hypothesis, but with different CF, the 
combination function is defined as: 
 CFcomb(CF1, CF2) = CF1 + CF2 ( 1 – CF1)      when both > 0  (2.8)






+         when one < 0  
                                CF1 + CF2 (1 + CF1)         when both < 0  
 
Suppose CF2 = 0.5. Then using Equation 2.8 
  CFcomb(0.21, 0.5) = 0.21 + 0.5 ( 1 – 0.21) 
        =0.605 
We now look at belief models, where degrees of belief are modeled by a range of 
values rather than a single point. [Dubois96] presents an excellent argument why 
beliefs should not be represented by just a single point-probability. 
2.2.4 Dempster-Shafer Theory 
In 1967 Dempster modeled uncertainty with a range of probabilities [Demp67] rather 
than a single number. Shafer extended this in 1976 [Shaf76], producing what is known 
today as Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST). In DST the environment is assumed to be a 
fixed set of mutually exclusive elements, symbolized by Θ :  
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  Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, … } 
Suppose Lulu works in a clinic. In her entire medical career Lulu has seen only three 
symptoms. Her environment consists of: 
  Θ = {fever, spots, cough} 
Suppose that Lulu’s experience tells her that there is a likelihood of 0.3 that she will 
see someone with fever: 
  m1({fever}) = 0.3, m1(Θ) = 0.7 
Later she decides that there is a likelihood of 0.6 of seeing someone with spots: 
  m2({spots}) = 0.6, m2(Θ) = 0.4 
We apply Dempster’s Rule of Combination to combine this new evidence with what 
Lulu already knows: 
  mi ⊕ mj (Z) = ΣX∩Y=Z mi(X) mj(Y)   
This can be represented as a table: 
 m2({spots}) = 0.6 m2(Θ) = 0.4 
m1({fever}) = 0.3 ∅ = 0.18 fever = 0.12 
m1(Θ) = 0.7 spots = 0.42 Θ = 0.28 
Table 2.10 Combining evidence for m1({fever}) and m2({spots}) 
 
Letting m3 = m1 ⊕ m2 for notational convenience: 
  m3({spots}) = 0.42 
  m3({fever}) = 0.12 
  m3(Θ) = 0.28 
However, in DST the mass of the empty set is always 0, so m3(∅) = 0.0 and not 0.18. 
The mass for ∅  is instead assigned to κ, called the evidential conflict. κ measures the 
compatibility between two pieces of evidence. When two pieces are completely 
compatibly, κ = 0. When they are completely incompatible, κ = 1.0. Intermediate 
values show intermediate levels of conflict or compatibility. 
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Currently the belief masses do not sum to 1. To normalize the masses, we divide every 
mass by 1 - κ, giving us: 




  m3({fever}) = 18.01
12.0
− = 0.15 
  m3(Θ) =
18.01
28.0
− = 0.34  
Suppose Lulu recently learnt that there is a likelihood of 0.5 of encountering a patient 
with cough: 
m4 ({cough}) = 0.5  
Combining this with her existing knowledge: 
 m4({cough}) = 0.5 m4(Θ) = 0.5 
m3({spots}) = 0.51 ∅ = 0.255 spots = 0.255 
m3({fever}) = 0.15 ∅ = 0.075 fever = 0.075 
m3(Θ) =0.34  cough = 0.17 Θ = 0.17 
Table 2.11 Adding in m4({cough}) 
Let m5 = m4 ⊕ m3. Then: 
  m5({cough}) = 0.17 
  m5({spots}) = 0.255 
  m5({fever}) = 0.075  
  m5(Θ) = 0.17 
  κ = 0.255 + 0.075 = 0.33 
Normalizing: 
  m5({cough})  = 25.0
33.01
17.0 =−  
  m5({spots})  = 38.033.01
255.0 =−   
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  m5({fever})  = 11.0
33.01
075.0 =−  
  m5(Θ)   = 25.0
33.01
15.0 =−  
Lulu learns from her huge tomes of medical texts that: 
  flu = {fever, cough} 
  measles = {fever, spots} 
  SARS = {fever, spots, cough} 
Alice walks in with a fever and a cough, and medical tests show that there is a 
likelihood of 0.64 that she has the flu. Thus: 
  m6({fever, cough}) = 0.64. 
Combining with the current evidence: 
 m6({fever, cough}) =0.64 m6(Θ) = 0.36 
m5({fever}) =0.25 fever = 0.16 fever = 0.13 
m5({spots}) = 0.38 ∅ = 0.24 spots = 0.14 
m5({cough}) = 0.11 cough = 0.07 cough = 0.04 
m5(Θ) = 0.25 fever, cough = 0.16 Θ = 0.09 
Table 2.12 Adding in hypothesis flu = {fever, cough} 
Letting m7 = m5 ⊕ m6: 
 m7({fever}) = 0.16 + 0.13 = 0.29 
 m7({spots}) = 0.14 
 m7({cough}) = 0.07 + 0.04 = 0.11 
 m7({fever, cough}) = 0.16 
 m7(Θ) =  0.09 
 κ = 0.24 
Normalizing we get: 
 m7({fever}) = 0.38 
 m7({spots}) = 0.18 
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 m7({cough}) = 0.14 
 m7({fever, cough}) = 0.21 
 m7(Θ) = 0.12  
Thus combining all that Lulu knows, Alice has a belief mass of 0.21 of having a flu. 
We can now find our belief that Alice has the flu. The belief in a set X is given by: 
  Bel(X) = ΣY⊆X m(y) 
Thus our belief that Alice has the flu is given by: 
 Bel(flu) = m({cough}) + m({fever}) + m({cough, fever}) 
   = 0.38 + 0.14 + 0.21 
   = 0.73 
The doubt that Alice has the flu is given by: 
  Dbt(flu) = Bel(flu’) 
   = Bel({cough, fever}’) 
   = Bel({spots}) 
   = m({spots}) 
   =0.18 
Here X’ indicates the set complement of X. 
The plausibility that Alice has the flu is given by: 
  Pls(flu) = 1 – Dbt(flu) 
   = 1 – 0.18 
   = 0.82 
The evidential interval EI(flu) is given by: 
  EI(flu)  = [Bel(flu), Pls(flu)] 
   = [0.73, 0.82] 
The evidential interval may be interpreted as follows: 
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EI Interpretation 
[1, 1] Completely true 
[0, 0] Complete false 
[0, 1] Completely ignorant 
[Bel, 1] Tends to support (0 < Bel < 1) 
[0, Pls] Tends to refute (0 < Pls < 1) 
[Bel, Pls] Tends to both support and refute (0 < Bel < 
Pls < 1) 
Table 2.13 Interpreting the Evidential Interval EI 
 
The ignorance is given by: 
  Igr(flu) = Pls(flu) – Bel(flu) 
   = 0.82 – 0.73 
   = 0.09 





EI(flu) [0.73, 0.82], evidence tends to both 
support and refute the hypothesis. 
Table 2.14 Summary of our belief that Alice has the flu 
DST cannot deal properly with extreme belief masses. Suppose two doctors make the 
following diagnosis (Example is taken from [Giarratano94]): 
  mA({meningitis})  = 0.99 
  mA({tumor})  = 0.01 
  mB({concussion}) = 0.99 
  mB({tumor})   = 0.01 
Combining the belief masses: 
 mA({meningitis}) = 0.99 mA({tumor}) = 0.01 
mB({concussion}) = 0.99 ∅ = 0.98 ∅ = 0.0099 
mB({tumor}) = 0.01 ∅ = 0.0099 tumor = 0.0001 
Table 2.15 Extreme Belief Masses 
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This gives us: 
mA ⊕ mB({tumor}) = 0.0001 
κ =0.98 + 0.0099 + 0.0099 = 0.9998 
Normalizing  mA ⊕ mB({tumor}): 
  mA ⊕ mB({tumor}) ≈ 1.0 
We have the counterintuitive situation where even though both doctors diagnose that 
the chances of a tumor is very low, when we combine their evidences it becomes 
certain that the patient has a tumor. 
2.2.5 Transferable Belief Model 
The Transferable Belief Model (TBM) by Smets [Smets00]  may be viewed as a 
generalization of Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST). 
Formally, in Smets’ notation Ω, the frame of discernment, is a finite set of “worlds”, 
one of which might correspond to the actual world w0. The basic belief assignment 
(bba) m(A) is the portion of belief that supports the belief that w0 is in A.  Unlike DST 
however, in TBM there is an open-world assumption that states that it is possible that 
m(∅)≠0, and thus w0 might not be in Ω. The belief bel(A) and plausibility pl(A) is 
defined exactly as in DST. 
Given another subset B possibly containing w0, if there is evidence that w0 is certainly 
in A and not in A’, then B may be conditioned on A. Effective, this means that the bba 
m(B) is transferred to m(B ∩ A), and that every world in A’ must be eliminated. The 
“Transferable” in “Transferable Belief Model” comes from this operation. 
Smets also introduces the notion of a credal level, where beliefs are maintained, and a 
pignistic level, where decisions are made based on the beliefs maintained at the credal 
level. He defines a pignistic function: 













The pignistic function is a probability function that is then used as a utility function to 
make decisions. 
2.2.6 Probabilistic Argumentation System 
Probabilistic Argumentation System (PAS) was proposed by Picard in [Picard00]. PAS 
has been used for information retrieval and for classifying and searching websites 
[Picard01] 
A Propositional (note: not Probabilistic) Argumentation System consists of a disjoint 
set of symbols A and P, and a knowledge base ξ. The set A is the set of assumptions of 
our system, the set P is the set of variables that depend on A, while ξ consists of 
relations between A and P. We consider a concrete example from [Picard00]. 
Suppose we have a set of variables P = {P1, P2}, a set of assumptions A={a1, a2, a3,, 
l21}, and a knowledge base ξ = {ξ1: a1 → P1, ξ2: a2 → P2, ξ3: P2 ∧ l21 → P1,  ξ4: a3 
→¬ P1}.  
The quasi-support qs(h, ξ) is defined as the disjunction of all minimal arguments 
supporting a hypothesis h. The arguments support P1 are a1, and through the relations 
a2 → P2 and  through the relation P2 ∧ l21 → P1, a2 ∧ l21 also supports P1. Therefore: 
 qs(P1, ξ) = a1 ∨ (a2 ∧ l21) 
The quasi-support qs(⊥, ξ) is the disjunction of all statements that contradict ξ.  In our 
example, P1 ∧ ¬ P1 is a contradiction of ξ: 
  qs(⊥, ξ) = (a1 ∨ (a2 ∧ l21)) ∧ a3. 
   =(a1  ∧ a3) ∨ (a2 ∧ l21 ∧ a3) 
The support sp(h,  ξ) is defined to be: 
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  sp(h, ξ) = qs(h, ξ) ∧ ¬ qs(⊥, ξ) 
  sp(P1, ξ)  = (a1 ∨ (a2 ∧ l21)) ∧ ¬ ((a1  ∧ a3) ∨ (a2 ∧ l21 ∧ a3)) 
    = (a1 ∧ ¬ a3) ∨ (a2 ∧ l21 ∧ ¬ a3) 
Let X be the set of probabilities assigned to the assumptions in A. A Probabilistic 
Argumentation System is then defined by the sets A, P, X and ξ. 
Suppose X = {p(a1) = 0.4, p(a2) = 0.6, p(a3) = 0.3, p(l21) = 0.5}. Then the degree of 
support dsp can be computed by: 










In our example, qs(P1, ξ) = a1 ∨ (a2 ∧ l21),  and in disjoint form: 
 p(qs(P1, ξ)) = a1 ∨ (a2 ∧ l21 ∧ ¬ a1) 
  = p(a1) + p(a2) p(l21)(1 – p(a1)) 
  = 0.4 + 0.6 X 0.3 X (1 – 0.4) 
  = 0.508 
Similarly, p(qs(⊥,ξ)) = 0.174. So our degree of support for P1 is: 





      ≈ 0.4044 
The plausibility pla(P1, ξ) is defined as: 
 pla(h, ξ) = 1 – dsp(¬ P1, ξ ) (2.11)
 
Finding dsp(¬ P1, ξ): 
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     =  0.1525 
pla(P1, ξ)  = 1 – dsp(¬ P1, ξ) 
  = 1 – 0.1525 
  = 0.8475 
The ignorance igr(P1, ξ) is defined to be 
 igr(h, ξ) = pla(h, ξ) - dsp(h, ξ) (2.12)
 
So in our example: 
   igr(P1, ξ) = 0.8475 − 0.4044 
       = 0.4431 
Thus we have a certainty of 0.4044 that P1 is true, and we can be certain of this up to a 
degree of 0.8475. Our ignorance is 0.4431. 
2.2.7 Recent Research 
Much research has been carried out even in recent years on multivalued reasoning. In 
this section we look only at a very small portion of work that has been carried out, just 
to give a flavor of the multivalued reasoning scene. 
One of the greatest challenges in Dempster-Shafer Theory and the Transferable Belief 
Model is the amount of computing power required to calculate the belief of the various 
subsets in the frame of discernment. In [Haenni03b] Haenni and Lehmann propose a 
set of algorithms for implementing belief computations.  These algorithms are based 
on bit manipulation and experiment results on 2,113,370 set intersections show an 
improvement of over one thousand times in execution time over simple linked lists. 
Some research has been done on the application of belief functions to solving real 
classical AI problems. In [Elouedi01] for example Zied, Khalid and Smets propose a 
new method for growing decision trees based on Smets’ Pignistic Transformation and 
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the Transferable Belief Model instead of standard information theory. The use of TBM 
allows uncertainty and even ignorance in the classifications used to grow the tree to be 
effectively modeled. The authors also describe how to make decisions using trees 
based on TBM. [Vannoor02] applies Belief Decision Trees to handle imprecisely 
labeled training data for classification problems. 
Much work has also been done on formulating new belief reasoning formalisms. In 
[Boeva99], Boeva, Tsiporkova and De Baets extend classical modal logic with 
plausibility and belief measures. Modal logic is an extension of Propositional Logic, 
and consists of a set of possible worlds, a binary relation between worlds called an 
accessibility function, and an assignment function that assigns truth values to atomic 
propositions about each possible world.  Boeva et al treat the accessibility function as a 
multi-valued function, thus inducing plausibility and belief  measures on this function 
on each of the possible worlds. The inverse of the assignment function is also viewed 
as the second multi-valued function, inducing plausibility and belief measures on the 
propositions of each possible world. 
In [Koller92] Koller and Halpern propose two new types of entailments  to reason with 
imprecise information. A cautious entailment allows only completely justified 
conclusions. For example, if we know that “John is 1.88 meters tall”, and later obtain a 
contradictory piece of evidence that “John is about 1.90 meters tall”, then a cautious 
entailment allows us to conclude that John is any height between 1.88 and 1.90 meters 
tall. i.e. a cautious entailment allows us to conclude any value between two 
contradictory values. A bold entailment on the other hand allows us to conclude that 
“John is approximately h meters tall” for any h between 1.88 and 1.90 meters tall. 
Thus we might “guestimate” that John is 1.92 meters tall. The authors present 
theorems to investigate the properties of their logic system. 
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In [Parson94] Parsons and Kubat propose a symbolic reasoning system based on rough 
sets. Details of rough sets may be found in [Pawlak84] and [Pawlak88]. Briefly, 
Parsons and Kubat define logical relations in terms of operations on rough sets. 
Objects of interest are organized into rough sets, and the logical relations are rendered 
to rough set operations that manipulate members of the set to perform reasoning. A 
proposition p is determined to be true, roughly true, unknown, roughly false and false 
based on the set membership after the set operations corresponding to the logical 
operations in p are performed on the rough set. A min-max approach similar to that 
used in fuzzy logic is used to combine these “rough values” to produce the final 
outcome.  
Finally, Haenni and Lehmann [Haenni03a] propose a framework for unifying 
Dempster-Shafer type reasoning systems (including the Transferable Belief Model) 
and Probabilistic Argumentation Systems. They argue that PAS provides for a 
powerful modeling language that will work on top of DST, and that DST forms an 
efficient computational tool for PAS, and provide rules for “interfacing” the two 
systems.  
2.2.8 Discussion 
Multi-valued logic provides us with a powerful means to represent the truth of a 
statement in our largely analog world. N-valued logic like those proposed by 
Lucasiewicz allow us to represent truth in exactly N values (hence the name), while 
approximate reasoning methods like Fuzzy Logic and Dempster Shafer Theory (DST) 
allow us greater expressiveness at the expense of exactness.  In addition unlike 
statistical methods, DST, the Transferable Belief Model (TBM) and Probabilistic 
Argumentative Systems (PAS) also allow us to work in ignorance into our knowledge 
of the world, expressed in the form of a range of belief values instead of a single point 
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value. Multi-valued logic systems thus provide us with powerful methods to model 
uncertainty and impreciseness in the real world. 
2.3 Combining Knowledge Representation with Approximate 
Reasoning 
The rich field of artificial intelligence has provided researchers with a wealth of 
knowledge representation structures [Grosso97]. Frames in particular are a powerful 
tool to organize relations between concepts in our world, including the ability to inherit 
properties from other frames, and to abstract properties from a set of frames, allowing 
us to specialize and generalize concepts. 
Slot values in frames are often deterministic. We propose assigning belief values to 
these slot values to introduce the ability to model uncertainty. While this is effectively 
equivalent to the very un-novel idea of assigning probabilities to relationships between 
concepts and entities, our approach is novel because: 
i) We are assigning belief masses rather than probabilities, thus allowing 
us to not only model the uncertainty in the relationship, but also our 
ignorance and doubt. 
ii) By introducing the belief masses within the framework of AI frames, 
we are able to formalize how the belief masses may be assigned, 
propagated, inherited and abstracted. 
iii) We are able to define operations on the frames, and how these 
operations affect the belief measures. 
iv) Since the frames represent entities and concepts, we can not only 
introduce belief measures on the relationships between frames, but also 
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on the very existence (for an entity) or validity (for a concept) of the 
frame. 
In addition, we propose a reasoning system based on assigning separate belief masses 
for supporting and refuting a fact. Unlike current approximate reasoning systems, the 
supporting and refuting masses are completely independent, allowing us greater 
flexibility and expressiveness in modeling a problem.  
We call our composite frame-belief structure a “Belief Augmented Frame” or BAF, 
and the underlying two-mass logic system BAF-Logic, or BAF-Logic. We will expand 
on BAF and BAF-Logic further in the next chapter, forming the core of this thesis. 
These ideas were first presented in [Tan03a] and [Tan03b]. 
Related work include [Griffiths02] by Griffiths and Steyvers which applies 
probabilities attached to semantic structures to predict concepts that are likely to 
appear in a document.  Much more relevantly, in [Koller98] Koller and Pfeffer propose 
a language that allows one to attach probabilistic scores to frame relations. Reasoning 
is performed by reducing relations and their scores to a Bayesian network and applying 
standard Bayesian techniques. This method is still probabilistic, however, and thus 
suffers from classical probability’s inability to model ignorance. 
2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter we presented a brief overview of the topics that are relevant to this 
thesis. We began by presenting classical two-valued logic systems, namely 
Propositional Logic and Predicate Logic. We showed that two-valued logic systems 
were inadequate, and we introduced a number of multi-valued logic systems that 
overcome the limitations of two-valued logic. We briefly covered statistical methods, 
and we covered in some detail popular multi-valued logic systems like Lukasiewicz 
logic systems, Dempster-Shafer Theory, Transferable Belief Model, Probabilistic 
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Argumentation Systems and Fuzzy Logic. We presented briefly the latest research in 
this area of approximate reasoning. We then proceeded to discuss knowledge 
representation structures commonly used in AI, and we proposed a new reasoning 
system that not only combines the structured approach of AI frames with multi-valued 
logic, but also proposed a novel approximate reasoning system that represents belief 
masses for and against a fact separately.  
In the following chapter we expand further on these ideas, and show that our new 
reasoning system is conditionally  sound. 
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Chapter 3 An Introduction To Belief Augmented Frames 
Frames are a powerful method of representing knowledge in AI, providing structure 
and operations that allow us to model an agent’s world effectively. In this chapter we 
enhance AI frames with belief masses. This introduces uncertainty into the frame slot-
value pairs (and consequently, on the relationships between frames), and allows us to 
model ignorance. We then present a reasoning system that performs non-monotonic 
reasoning on relationships between frames using the belief measures. We show that 
our reasoning system is conditionally sound. We will present experiment results 
exploring the circumstances in which our reasoning system may produce unsound 
inferences, and we propose a solution to this. Finally we conclude this chapter with 
recommendations for further work, and a summary of this chapter’s contributions. 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we introduce the Belief Augmented Frame (BAF), a way of 
representing knowledge together with numeric values representing our belief and 
disbelief in that knowledge. In Section 3.3 we introduce some definitions used to build 
our concept of BAFs,  and in Section 3.4 we explore how reasoning may be performed 
with BAFs. In Section 3.5 we formally define the reasoning system in BAFs. In 
Section 3.6 we list the operations that may be performed on BAFs, and in Section 3.7 
we look at some ways a-priori belief masses may be computed. In Section 3.8 we 
present experiments to determine the circumstances under which reasoning in BAFs 
may produce unsound conclusions. In Section 3.9 we present a summary of this 
chapter and some recommendations for further work, and finally in Section 3.10 we 
show the contributions of this chapter. 
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3.2  Belief Augmented Frames 
A Belief Augmented Frame (or BAF) is modeled as a standard AI frame. Each frame 
consists of a frame label naming the frame, and a set of slots. Each slot may either be 
empty or linked to other frames. BAFs are hierarchical, and operations are defined to 
group several BAFs together as children of a superframe through “parent” relations. 
The superframe maintains “child” relations with its children. These relations allow us 
to find all the child and parent relations of a frame.  
Each BAF represents a concept or an object in our universe, while each slot represents 
a relation between concepts and objects. 
Each BAF B has two values ϕTB and ϕFB assigned to it, representing our belief or 
disbelief that the proposition B (denoting the existence of a a concept or object B 
exists) is true. Each relationship to another BAF C is also assigned two values ϕTBC 
and ϕFBC representing our belief and disbelief in the proposition that the relationship 
between B and C exists. Having two belief values, one supporting the existence and the 
other refuting it, frees us from the conventional requirement that ϕF = 1 - ϕT, and gives 
us a convenient way to compute ignorance. In BAF ignorance is declared when the 
amount of belief supporting the existence of a concept or relation is weighed almost 
equally by the amount of disbelief refuting the existence. 
Note also that  the belief masses ϕT  and ϕF are generally different from the belief 
masses used in Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST). ϕT  and ϕF would for example, often 
be generated from logical statements rather than from Dempster’s Rule of 
Combination. However as we will show later in Chapter 4, these belief masses can be 
used to generate belief values for DST. 
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Figure 3.1 BAFs representing “Alice owns a grey donkey and  
walks a blue dog by the bay” 
This figure shows an interpretation for “Alice owns a grey donkey and walks a blue 
dog by the bay”. We don’t have any doubt that Alice exists, so her existence score is 
(1.0, 0.0), which is to be read that “there is 100% support that Alice exists, and 0 % 
refutation of her existence”. However we are a little suspicious of  her claim to own a 
grey donkey, and hence the donkey’s existence is only 0.6, and a Friend tells us that he 
is 30% certain that the donkey is fictitious. Hence we assign a belief of 0.3 refuting the 
existence of the donkey. The remaining belief masses may be similarly derived. 
In the following sections we will formally define BAFs, the operations that may be 
performed on a BAF, and how reasoning may be performed. 
3.3 Definitions 
Definition 3.1 A Belief Augmented Frame Knowledge Base (BAF-KB, or simply KB) 
is defined to be a set of concepts C. Informally, a concept ci ∈ C corresponds to an 
idea or a concrete object in the world. For example, “train”, “orange”, “car” and 
“sneeze” are all valid concepts in the BAF-KB. Since all objects and concepts are 
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abstracted into ideas in our “mind”, this work will not differentiate between a tangible 
object (e.g. a car) versus an abstract idea (e.g. the color blue). The words “object” and 
“concept” will be used interchangeably. 
Definition 3.2 A Supporting Belief Mass (or just simply “Supporting Mass”) ϕT 
measures how much we believe in the existence of a concept or a relation between 
concepts is true. A Refuting Belief Mass (“Refuting Mass”) ϕF measures how much 
we believe that a concept does not exist, or a relation between two concepts is untrue. 
In general, 0 ≤ ϕT, ϕF ≤ 1, and  ϕT + ϕF≠ 1. The last condition is in fact the reason why 
we have both a supporting and a refuting belief mass; this allows us to eliminate the 
constraint that ϕF = 1 – ϕT. The Supporting and Refuting Belief Masses for the 
existence of a concept ci is denoted as ϕTi and ϕFi respectively, and for the kth relation 
between concept ci and cj they are denoted as ϕTijk and ϕFijk respectively. 
Note that by this definition, it is possible that ϕTi + ϕFi > 1 and ϕTijk + ϕFijk > 1. The 
Utility Function Ui and Uijk may be used to re-map the combined masses to the range 
[0, 1] if this is desired. 
Definition 3.3 A concept ci∈ C is defined as a 4-tuple (cli, ϕTi, ϕFi, AVi), where cli is 
the name of the concept, ϕTi is our supporting belief mass that this concept exists, ϕFi is 
our refuting belief mass. AVi is a set of relations relating ci with some cj ∈ C. Note that 
there is no restriction that i ≠ j, so a concept may be related with itself. 
Definition 3.4 A relation avijk ∈ AVi is the kth relation between a concept ci to a 
concept cj. A relation avijk consists of a 4-tuple (alijk, cdj, ϕTijk, ϕFijk), where alijk is the 
name of the kth (k ≥ 1) relation between ci and cj, cdj is the label for cj, ϕTijk is our 
supporting belief mass that the kth relationship between ci and cj is true, while ϕFijk is 
our refuting belief mass.  
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Definition 3.5 The Degree of Inclination DIi for the existence of a concept ci and DIijk 
for the kth relation between concepts ci and cj is defined as the difference between the 
supporting and refuting belief masses: 
 DIi = ϕTi - ϕFi (3.1a) 
 DIijk = ϕTijk - ϕFijk (3.1b)
For convenience we use the notation DI when it is immaterial whether we are referring 
to DIi or DIijk. DI measures the truth or falsehood of a statement, and is bounded    by 























Figure 3.2 Possible Interpretation of the Degree of Inclination DI 
 
DI gives us a convenient way to detect conflicting facts. Suppose we have a fact P (a 
fact might refer to the existence of a concept, or the existence of a relation between 
concepts) with degree of inclination DIP. Suppose we re-evaluate P and obtain DIP’. 
The facts are contradictory if DIP . DIP’ < 0, since they give opposing truth values after 
re-evaluation of P. 
Definition 3.6 The Utility Function Ui and Uijk is defined as: 
 Ui = 
2




1 ijkDI+  (3.2b)
For notational convenience we will use U to refer to either Ui or Uijk. U shifts the range 
of DI from [-1, 1] to [0, 1] to allow ϕT and ϕF to be used as a utility function (hence its 
name) for decision making. Manipulating U algebraically, we can see that: 
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 U = 
2
1 DI+  
  = 
2
)(1 FT ϕϕ −+  
  = 
2
)1( FT ϕϕ −+  
We can derive a similar value V for the refuting belief mass. 
    V  =
2
)1( TF ϕϕ −+  
We can relate U and V. Taking  1 – U 
 1 – U  = 1-
2
)1( FT ϕϕ −+  
  = 
2
)1( TF ϕϕ −+  
  = V 
U can therefore be taken as a mapping between the supporting and refuting belief 
masses to a single probabilistic measure of the truth of the proposition. A proposition 
has a probability U of being true, and a probability 1 – U = V of being false. 
Definition 3.7 The Evidential Conflict ECi or ECijk is defined as: 
 ECi  = 1 - |DIi| (3.3a) 
 ECijk = 1 - |DIijk| (3.3b)
The term EC is used to refer to either ECi or ECijk, when the context is unimportant. If 
EC is large, this means that ϕT and ϕF are very close in value. i.e. the evidence 
provided is conflicting and equally supports or refutes a fact. EC therefore measures 
the amount of conflict in the supporting and refuting evidence. 
ECi is the evidential conflict in the existence of a concept or object i, and ECijk is the 
corresponding measure for the kth relation between a concept i and another concept j. 
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Definition 3.8  The plausibility of the existence of a concept or a relation given the 
refuting belief mass is given by: 
 Pli = 1 - ϕFi (3.4a) 
 Plijk = 1 - ϕFijk (3.4b)
Definition 3.9 The Evidential Interval EIi and EIijk are given by: 
 EIi = [ϕTi, Pli] (3.5a) 
 EIij = [ϕTijk, Plijk] (3.5b)
Definition 3.10 The Ignorance Igi and Igijk are given by: 
 Igi = Pli - ϕTi (3.6a) 
 Igijk = Plijk - ϕTijk (3.6b)
Together Definitions 3.7 to 3.10 measure the quality of the evidence supporting and 
refuting the existence of a concept or of a relation. Table 3.1 gives the interpretation of 
the evidential interval EI: 
Evidential Interval Interpretation 
[0, 1] We are completely ignorant of the truth of the fact. 
[0, 0] Our evidence completely refutes the fact. 
[1, 1] Our evidence completely supports the fact. 
[ϕT, Pl] 0 < ϕT, Pl < 1 
              Pl ≥ ϕT 
Our evidence both supports and refutes the fact. 
[ϕT, Pl] 0 < ϕT, Pl < 1 
              Pl < ϕT 
Our evidence supporting the fact exceeds the plausibility 
of the fact. i.e. the evidence is contradictory. 
Table 3.1 Interpretation for Evidential Interval EI 
Definition 3.11 If we are unaware of the existence of a concept ci or a relation avijk, or 
if we have no information on the reliability of this information, we will assign a default 
support belief mass of ϕDT and ϕDF to this information. In general ϕDT and ϕDF should 
be small to reflect our lack of confidence in the relation or the existence of the concept, 
and ϕDT≈ϕDF to give us a small DID, reflecting our ignorance.  
Our ignorance in BAF can come in one of two ways; either both the supporting and 
refuting belief masses are equally strong resulting in DI = 0, or we are genuinely 
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unaware of this concept or object. The default belief masses are useful in modeling the 
latter and makes allowances for an open-world assumption. i.e. whenever we 
encounter an object, concept or relation that we are unaware of, assign it a supporting 
belief mass of ϕTD and a refuting belief mass of ϕFD. 
3.4 Combining Belief Masses in BAFs 
In the previous section we defined the concept of a Belief Augmented Frame, and 
established our belief in the existence of any concept or object and the relationships 
between them is denoted by a supporting belief mass representing our belief that the 
object or relationship exists, and a refuting belief mass representing our countering 
disbelief that the object or relationship exists. In this section we will define how both 
our supporting and refuting belief masses may be combined, and in the following 
section we will formally define the rules of combination. 
To simplify notation, we will use single-letter propositional symbols like P and Q to 
represent the fact that a concept ci exists, or a relation avijk exists between concepts ci 
and cj. We write (P, ϕTP, ϕFP) to represent a proposition P with supporting belief mass 
ϕTP and refuting belief mass ϕFP. 
Note that while we use Propositional Logic style symbols like P and Q to express 
propositions, BAF-Logic (as defined later) is a first-order logic system. Clauses are 
defined over entire classes of objects instead of for individual objects. 
Definition 3.12 Given a proposition (P, ϕTP, ϕFP) and given a proposition (Q, ϕTQ 
,ϕFQ), we define: 
 ϕTP∧Q = min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) (3.7)
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Intuitively, this states that since both P and Q must be true for P∧ Q to be true, our 
knowledge of P ∧ Q being true will only be as good as our most unreliable piece of 
evidence supporting P ∧ Q. 
Definition 3.13 Continuing with propositions P and Q above, we define: 
 ϕTP∨Q = max(ϕTP, ϕTQ) (3.8)
Again this states that P ∨ Q is true when either P is true or Q is true, we are willing to 
invest as much confidence in P ∨ Q as the strongest piece of evidence supporting P ∨ 
Q. 
Having defined both ϕTP∨Q and ϕTP∧Q, we can similarly derive ϕFP∨Q and ϕFP∧Q.  
 ϕFP∧ Q = max(ϕFP, ϕFQ) (3.9a) 
 ϕFP∨ Q = min(ϕFP, ϕFQ) (3.9b)
This means that for the proposition P∧ Q to be false, either P OR Q is false. Hence 
following Equation 3.8 we take the maximum of ϕFP, and ϕFQ to compute ϕFP∧ Q. 
Similarly for P ∨ Q to be false, both P AND Q must be false. We thus take the 
minimum of ϕFP, ϕFQ  to find ϕFP∨ Q. 
Definitions 3.12 and 3.13 are similar to the conjunction and disjunction rules used in 
Probabilistic Argumentation Systems [Picard00]. However we use the min function 
instead of multiplication to combine belief masses in conjunctions, and we use the max 
function in disjunctions instead of add. This has three advantages: 
i) The idea of choosing a min and max functions to combine belief 
masses in a conjunction and a disjunction respectively has an intuitive 
basis as proposed in Definitions 3.12 and 3.13. 
ii) We avoid the problem of the belief mass of a long series of 
conjunctions decaying to 0. Likewise, given a disjunction over many 
propositions Pi each with very small belief masses, we can avoid the 
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situation of placing absolute belief (ϕTPi = 1) on a proposition even 
though the propositions in the disjunction themselves have tiny belief 
masses.  
iii) Additionally, the use of min(.) and max(.) functions eases defining the 
relationship between the supporting and refuting belief masses. If the 
supporting mass is a min(.) function, then the refuting mass is a 
max(.) function and vice-versa, as shown in Definition 3.13 above. 
This is more intuitive than to say that if the supporting mass is a 
multiply function, then the refuting mass should be an add function. 
Definition 3.14 By definition, the supporting belief mass ϕPT is a measure of how 
confident we are that a proposition P is true, while the refuting belief mass ϕPF is a 
measure of how confident we are that the proposition is not true. We can define the 
logical negation ¬P as: 
 ϕT¬P = ϕFP (3.10a) 
 ϕF¬P = ϕTP (3.10b)
Definitions 3.12 to 3.14 allow us to compute the supporting and refuting belief masses 
for any Propositional Logic statement. The soundness of reasoning rules will be 
discussed in the next section. 
Definition 3.15 Two special supporting and refuting belief mass assignments ONE and 
ZERO are defined as: 
 ϕTONE = 1 (3.11a) 
 ϕFONE = 0 (3.11b)
 ϕTZERO= 0 (3.11c) 
 ϕFZERO= 1 (3.11d)
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ONE corresponds to True and ZERO to False in Propositional Logic, and come in 
particularly useful in defining tautology, contradiction and absorption in BAF-Logic. 
Example 3.1 Given our knowledge base KBY1 = {(P, 0.9, 0.1), (Q, 0.7, 0.2), (R, 0.1, 
0.9)}, find the truth values for P ∧ (Q ∨ R): 
 ϕTP∧(Q∨R)  = min(ϕTP, max(ϕTQ, ϕTR)) 
    = min(0.9, max(0.7, 0.2)) 
   = min(0.9, 0.7) 
   = 0.7 
Using De-Morgan’s Theorem, the negation of  P ∧ (Q ∨ R) is ¬P ∨ (¬Q ∧ ¬ R) (De-
Morgan’s Theorem is proven in Property 3.6). 
 ϕF P ∧ (Q ∨ R) = max(ϕFP, min(ϕFQ, ϕFR)) 
   = max(0.2, min(0.1, 0.9)) 
   = max(0.2, 0.1) 
   = 0.2 
DIP∧(Q∨R) = 0.7 – 0.2 
   = 0.5 
The plausibility Pl P ∧ (Q ∨ R) is given by: 
 Pl P ∧ (Q ∨ R) = 1 - ϕF P ∧ (Q ∨ R) 
   = 1 – 0.2 
   = 0.8 
The Evidential Interval EI P ∧ (Q ∨ R) is therefore [0.7, 0.8], and thus the evidence both 
supports and refutes the relation P ∧ (Q ∨ R). Finally the ignorance and evidential 
conflict are: 
 IgP ∧ (Q ∨ R)  = 0.8 – 0.7 
   = 0.1 
An Introduction to Belief Augmented Frames 
46 
 EC P ∧ (Q ∨ R)  = 1.0 – DI P ∧ (Q ∨ R) 
   = 1 – 0.5 
                        = 0.5 
Based on DIP ∧ (Q ∨ R) we can conclude that given KBY1, P ∧ (Q ∨ R) is probably true. 
Example 3.2 Given our knowledge base KBY2 = {(P, 0.9, 0.1), (Q, 0.7,0.2), (R, 0.1, 
0.9)}, determine if this entails P ∧ Q → R 
  P ∧ Q → R   =  ¬(P∧Q) ∨ R 
                          = ¬ P ∨ ¬ Q ∨ R 
 ϕT P ∧ Q → R   = max(ϕPF, ϕQF, ϕRT) 
   = max(0.1, 0.2, 0.1) 
   = 0.2 
 ¬ (P ∧ Q → R ) = P ∧ Q ∧¬ R   
 ϕFg P ∧ Q → R   = min(ϕPT, ϕQT, ϕRF) 
   = min(0.9, 0.7, 0.9) 
   = 0.7 
 DI P ∧ Q → R   = 0.2 – 0.7 
   = - 0.5 
The plausibility of  P ∧ Q → R  is given by: 
 PlP ∧ Q → R  = 1.0 –0.7 
   = 0.3  
The Evidential Interval is: 
 EI P ∧ Q → R   = [0.2, 0.3] 
The ignorance is: 
 Ig P ∧ Q → R   = 0.3 – 0.2 
     = 0.1 
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From DI P ∧ Q → R  we conclude that it is unlikely, given the evidence, that KBY2 entails  
P ∧ Q → R. 
 Example 3.3 Given our knowledge base KBY3 = {(A, 0.7, 0.2), (B, 0.9, 0.1), 
(C,0.2,0.7), (A ∧ B→ R, 1.0, 0.0), (A∧¬B→¬R, 1.0, 0.0)}, find the supporting and 
refuting belief masses for R.  
Note that the belief masses for A ∧ B→ R and A∧¬B→¬R do not affect the belief 
calculations for R (since min(a, 1.0) = a and max(a, 0.0) = a, where a is some general 
numeric sub-expression), we have, for brevity, omitted them from the calculations 
shown in this example and the next. 
The facts supporting R are A ∧ B, as well as the negation of A ∧ ¬ B, which is ¬A ∨ B: 
 R  = (A ∧ B) ∧ (¬A ∨ B) 
ϕTR  = min(ϕTA, ϕTB, max(ϕFA, ϕTB)) 
= min(0.7, 0.9, max(0.2, 0.9)) 
= min(0.7, 0.9, 0.9) 
= 0.7 
 ¬R  = ¬((A ∧ B) ∧ (¬A ∨ B)) 
  = ¬A ∨ ¬ B ∨ (A ∧ ¬ B) 
 ϕFR = max(ϕFA, ϕFB, min(ϕTA, ϕFB)) 
  = max(0.2, 0.1, min(0.7, 0.1)) 
  = max(0.2, 0.1, 0.1) 
  = 0.2 
Thus DIR = 0.7 – 0.2 = 0.5, and R probably true given the evidence for and against it. 
The Plausibility is: 
 PlR  = 1.0 – 0.2 
  = 0.8 
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The Evidential Interval and Ignorance are: 
 EIR = [0.8, 0.9] 
 IgR = 0.9 – 0.8 
  = 0.1 
The Evidential Conflict is: 
 ECR = 1.0 – 0.5 
  = 0.5 
Example 3.4 Given the knowledge base in Example 3.3, and given further that (B ∧ 
C→ R, 1.0, 0.0), Compute the belief masses for R. 
  R  = (A ∧ B) ∧ (B ∧ C) ∧ (¬A ∨ B) 
  = A ∧ B ∧ C ∧ (¬A ∨ B) 
 ϕTR = min(ϕTA, ϕTB, ϕTC, max(ϕFA, ϕTB)) 
  = min(0.7, 0.9, 0.2, max(0.2, 0.9)) 
  = min(0.7, 0.9, 0.2, 0.9) 
  = 0.2 
 ¬R  = ¬( A ∧ B ∧ C ∧ (¬A ∨ B)) 
  = ¬A ∨ ¬B ∨ ¬C ∨ (A ∧ ¬ B) 
 ϕFR = max(ϕFA, ϕFB, ϕFC, min(ϕFA, ϕFB)) 
  = max(0.2, 0.1, 0.7, min(0.2, 0.1)) 
  = max(0.2, 0.1, 0.7, 0.1) 
  = 0.7 
 DIR   = 0.2 – 0.7  
= -0.5 
In the light of new evidence, we now conclude that it is R is probably false. 
The new Plausibility is: 
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 PlR  = 1.0 – 0.7 
  = 0.3 
The new Evidential Interval and Ignorance are: 
 EIR  = [0.2, 0.3] 
 IgR = 0.1 
The Evidential Conflict is now: 
 ECR = 1.0 – 0.5 
  = 0.5 
In keeping with our new conclusion that the evidence does not support our claim R, the 
plausibility has fallen from 0.9 to just 0.3. 
3.5 Reasoning in Belief Augmented Frames 
We formally define the Belief Augment Frame Logic System, or BAF-Logic, which 
can be used to reason about the existence of objects and the relations between them. 
BAF-Logic is closely linked with Propositional Logic, and in section 3.5.1 we define 
the symbols that make up BAF-Logic. In section 3.5.2 we derive reasoning rules 
similar to those found in Propositional Logic, and finally in section 3.5.3 we 
summarize with a table showing the similarity and differences between Propositional 
Logic and BAF-Logic. 
3.5.1 Defining the BAF-Logic Language 
Defintion 3.16 The BAF-Logic language is defined by {S, C, SM, RM}, where S is the 
set of proposition symbols representing either the existence of an object or concept, or 
the relationships between them. C represents the set of connectives {∧ , ∨, ¬, →} 
representing respectively conjunction, disjunction, negation and implication. 
Additionally we have two symbols ‘(‘ and ‘)’ that are used to enforce precedents. The 
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logical sub-expressions between ‘(‘ and ‘)’ are evaluated before the sub-expressions 
outside. The sets SM and RM contain, respectively, the set of supporting and refuting 
belief masses that support or refute the propositions represented by the symbols in S. A 
proposition may be fully represented in our system by (p, sm, rm), where p ∈ S, sm ∈ 
SM and rm ∈ RM. All expressions are closed relative to the connectives. i.e. if P and Q 
are expressions in BAF-Logic, then P ∧ Q, P ∨ Q, P → Q, ¬ P and ¬ Q are all 
expressions in BAF-Logic. 
3.5.2  Properties of BAF-Logic 
BAF-Logic has many useful properties that allow us to perform reasoning. In this 
section we look at these properties and their proofs. 
Property 3.1 Associativity  
Given that P, Q  and R are propositions in the BAF-Logic system, the following 
relations hold. 
 (P ∧ Q) ∧ R = P ∧  (Q ∧ R) (3.12a) 
 (P ∨ Q) ∨ R = P ∨  (Q ∨ R) (3.12b)
Proof.  The proof is trivial, and essentially depends on the min and max functions 
themselves being associative. 
 ϕT(P ∧ Q) ∧ R  = min(min(ϕTP,  ϕTQ), ϕTR) 
   = min(ϕTP, min(ϕTQ, ϕTR)) 
   =  ϕTP ∧ (Q ∧ R) 
 ϕF(P ∧ Q) ∧ R  = max(max(ϕFP,  ϕFQ), ϕFR) 
   = max(ϕFP, max(ϕFQ, ϕFR)) 
   =  ϕFP ∧ (Q ∧ R) 
The proof for associativity over disjunctions is similar and is thus omitted. 
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Property 3.2 Commutativity 
For BAF propositions P and Q, the following relations hold: 
 P ∧ Q = Q ∧  P (3.13a) 
 P ∨ Q = Q ∨  P (3.13b)
Proof. The proof again is trivial, and relies on the commutative property of the min 
and max functions. 
 ϕT P ∧ Q  = min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) 
   = min(ϕTQ, ϕTP) 
   = ϕTQ∧P 
 ϕF P ∧ Q  = max(ϕFP, ϕFQ) 
   = max(ϕFQ, ϕFP) 
   = ϕFQ∧P 
The proof of commutativity over disjunctions is similar and is thus omitted. 
Property 3.3 Idempotency 
If P is a proposition under BAF-Logic reasoning, the following properties hold: 
 P ∧ P = P (3.14a) 
 P ∨ P = P (3.14b)
Proof. 
 ϕTP∧P  = min(ϕTP, ϕTP) 
   = ϕTP 
 ϕFP∧P  = max(ϕFP, ϕFP) 
   = ϕFP 
The proof for disjunction is similar and therefore omitted. 
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Property 3.4 Absorption 
The following absorption relations hold: 
 P ∧ ONE = P (3.15a) 
 P ∨ ZERO= P (3.15b)
Proof.  
 ϕT P ∧ ONE = min(ϕT P, ϕT ONE) 
   = min(ϕT P, 1) 
   = ϕT P   since ϕT P ≤ 1  
 ϕF P∧ ONE = max(ϕF P, ϕF ONE) 
   = max(ϕF P, 0) 
  = ϕF P    since ϕF P ≥ 0 
 ϕT P ∨ ZERO = max(ϕT P, ϕT ZERO) 
   = max(ϕT P, 0) 
   = ϕT P   since ϕT P ≥ 0  
 ϕF P∨ ZERO= min(ϕF P, ϕF ZERO) 
   = min(ϕF P, 1) 
  = ϕF P    since ϕF P ≤ 1 
Property 3.5 Contradiction and Tautology 
Given a BAF proposition P : 
 Contradiction: P ∧  ¬ P  will never be true    (3.16a) 
 Tautology:  P ∨  ¬ P will never be false    (3.16b) 
 Proof. 
 Contradiction 
ϕTP ∧ ¬P= min(ϕTP, ϕFP) 
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 ϕFP ∧ ¬P= max(ϕTP, ϕFP) 
 Since min(ϕTP, ϕFP) ≤  max(ϕTP, ϕFP) 
∴ϕTP ∧ ¬P ≤  ϕFP ∧ ¬P 
Therefore DIP ∧ ¬P = ϕTP ∧ ¬P  − ϕFP ∧ ¬P ≤ 0. Since DI P ∧ ¬P must be at least 0.25 to be 
true, P ∧ ¬P can never be true. 
Tautology 
ϕTP ∨ ¬P  = max(ϕTP, ϕFP) 
 ϕFP ∨ ¬P = min(ϕTP, ϕFP) 
Since max(ϕTP, ϕFP)≥ min(ϕTP, ϕFP), ϕTP ∨ ¬P ≥  ϕFP ∨ ¬P and therefore DI P ∨ ¬P ≥  0. 
Since DIP ∨ ¬P must be at most –0.25 to be false, P ∨ ¬P cannot be false. 
Contradiction and Tautology behave differently under BAF-Logic compared with 
Propositional Logic. Unlike conventional two-valued logic which always returns a 
FALSE for contradiction and a TRUE for tautology, BAF-Logic always returns: 
 DIP ∧ ¬P =  – | DIP |       (3.17a) 
 DIP ∨ ¬P = | DIP |       (3.17b) 
Thus instead of resulting in TRUE or FALSE values, tautology always returns a truth 
value that is equal in magnitude to the original Degree of Inclination but in the 
direction of TRUE, while contradiction always returns a truth value that is equal in 
magnitude to the original Degree of Inclination, but in the direction of FALSE. 
Property 3.6 De-Morgan’s Theorem 
The following properties hold for BAF propositions P and Q: 
 ¬(P ∧ Q) = ¬P ∨ ¬Q (3.18a) 
 ¬(P ∨ Q) = ¬P ∧ ¬Q (3.18b)
 




 Let R = P ∧ Q 
 ϕTR = ϕTP∧Q = min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) 
 ϕFR = ϕFP∧Q = max(ϕFP, ϕFQ) 
 Find ¬ R=¬(P ∧ Q)  
 ϕT¬ R  = ϕFR 
  = max(ϕFP, ϕFQ) 
 ϕF¬ R = ϕTR 
= min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) 
By definition, max(ϕFP, ϕFQ) and min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) are the supporting and refuting belief 
masses for ¬P ∨ ¬  Q respectively, therefore we can conclude that: 
¬ R = ¬(P ∧ Q)  
= ¬P ∨ ¬  Q  
The proof for De-Morgan’s Theorem over disjunctions is similar and thus omitted. 
Property 3.7 Negation Elimination 
 
For any proposition P: 
 ¬¬ P = P        (3.19) 
Proof. 
 Let P’ = ¬ P 
 ϕTP’ = ϕFP 
 ϕFP’ = ϕTP 
 Let P’’ = ¬ P’ 
  = ¬¬P 
 ϕTP’’ = ϕFP’ 
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  =ϕTP 
   ϕFP’’ = ϕTP’ 
  = ϕFP 
 Thus ¬¬P = P. 
Property 3.8   ∧-Introduction 
P and Q are propositions under the BAF-Logic  system. If P and Q are both at least  
probably true, then P ∧ Q will never be false. 
Proof. If both P and Q are probably true, then their supporting and refuting belief 
masses can be expressed as: 
 ϕTP ≥ ϕFP + 0.5        (A) 
 ϕTQ ≥ ϕFQ + 0.5        (B) 
By definition: 
 ϕTP∧Q = min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) 
 ϕFP∧Q = max(ϕFP, ϕFQ) 
Since ϕTP, ϕTQ ≤ 1,  from (A) and (B) we know that ϕFP, ϕFQ ≤ 0.5. Hence ϕFP∧Q ≤ 0.5. 
i.e. ϕFP∧Q is at most 0.5. 
Since ϕFP, ϕFQ ≥ 0.0,  from (A) and (B) the smallest possible value of ϕTP∧Q  is 0.5. Let 
DImin  be the minimum DIP∧Q. This occurs when ϕTP∧Q  is minimal and ϕFP∧Q  is 
maximal. Let ϕTmin be the minimum ϕTP∧Q andϕFmax be the maximum ϕFP∧Q: 
 DImin = ϕTmin −  ϕFmax 
  = 0.5 – 0.5 
  = 0.0 
Hence DIP∧Q ≥ 0.0, and P ∧ Q is never false. In Propositional Logic P ∧ Q is always 
TRUE when both P and Q are TRUE.  The strict rule that the supporting belief for a 
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conjunction is only as strong as the weakest proposition, while the refuting belief for a 
conjunction is as strong as the strongest argument against it may potentially result in 
very a conservative opinion that we are ignorant of the truth of the conjunction even 
though the propositions of the conjunction themselves are probably true. 
Property 3.9 ∧-Elimination 
Given that the conjunction P ∧ Q is not false, then the propositions P and Q are 
themselves not false. 
Proof.   
P ∧  Q not false ⇒ min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) ≥ max(ϕFP, ϕFQ). Since the smallest supporting belief 
mass is at least as large as the largest refuting belief mass, we have DIP, DIQ ≥ 0. Thus 
both P and Q are not false. 
Property 3.10 ∨-Introduction 
Given that the proposition P is not false, then P ∨ Q is never false regardless of Q. 
Proof. 
If P is not false, then ϕTP ≥ ϕFP.  
ϕTP∨Q = max(ϕTP, ϕTQ) 
ϕFP∨Q = min(ϕFP, ϕFQ) 
Regardless of the value of ϕFQ, ϕFP∨Q ≤ ϕFP by definition of the min(.) function. 
Likewise by definition of the max(.) function, ϕTP∨Q ≥ ϕTP. Since ϕTP ≥ ϕFP, ϕTP∨Q ≥ 
ϕFP∨Q. 
Property 3.11 ∨-Elimination 
Given that the disjunction P ∨ Q is as at least probably true, and if Q is probably false, 
then we can conclude that P is not false. 
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Proof. 
If P ∨ Q is at least probably true, then: 
 max(ϕTP, ϕTQ) ≥  min(ϕFP, ϕFQ) + 0.5 
Given that ϕTP∨Q = max(ϕTP, ϕTQ) ≤ 1, and given that ϕFP∨Q = min(ϕFP, ϕFQ) ≥ 0, we 
can conclude that: 
min(ϕFP, ϕFQ) ≤ 0.5        (A) 
max(ϕTP, ϕTQ) ≥ 0.5        (B) 
Since P is at least probably false, then ϕFP ≥ ϕTP + 0.5 
Again given the constraints that ϕFP ≤ 1.0 and ϕTP ≥ 0, we can conclude that: 
 ϕFP ≥ 0.5         (C) 
ϕTP ≤ 0.5         (D) 
From (D), (B) is generally satisfied if ϕTQ ≥ 0.5. Likewise from (C), (A) is in general 
satisfied if ϕFQ ≤ 0.5. This DIQ = ϕTQ − ϕFQ ≥ 0, and Q can never be false. 
Property 3.12 Modus Ponens 
If P → Q and P are at least probably true, then Q will never be false. We will use the 
Propositional Logic identity P → Q ≡ ¬ P ∨ Q, and show the rule of Modus Ponens 
(and the related Modus Tollens) applies. 
Proof. 
We rewrite P → Q as ¬ P ∨ Q: 
ϕTP→Q = max(ϕFP, ϕTQ) 
ϕFP→Q = min(ϕTP, ϕFQ) 
Since P → Q is at least probably true: 
 ϕTP→Q ≥   ϕTP→Q + 0.5       (A) 
 ∴ max(ϕFP, ϕTQ) ≥ min(ϕTP, ϕFQ) + 0.5     (B) 
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Since ϕFP→Q ≥ 0, max (ϕFP, ϕTQ) ≥ 0.5.      (C) 
P is also at least probably true. Thus ϕTP ≥ ϕFP + 0.5. Since ϕTP ≤ 1 by definition, ϕFP 
≤ 0.5.  
Since max (ϕFP, ϕTQ) ≥ 0.5 and ϕFP ≤ 0.5, we can conclude that ϕTQ ≥ 0.5.  (D) 
ϕTP→Q  = max (ϕFP, ϕTQ) ≤ 1,  and from (B) we can conclude that  min(ϕTP, ϕFQ) ≤ 0.5. 
Since ϕTP ≥ 0.5, this is only possible if ϕFQ ≤ 0.5.  
From (D), we haveϕTQ ≥ 0.5. Combining our results, we see that: 
 DIQ = ϕTQ − ϕFQ ≥ 0 
Thus Q can never be false. 
Property 3.13 Modus Tollens 
If P → Q is at least probably true and Q is at least probably false, then P will never be 
true. 
Proof. 
From Property 3.12, for P → Q to be at least probably true: 
max(ϕFP, ϕTQ) ≥  min(ϕTP, ϕFQ) + 0.5 
Again as determined in Property 3.12, 
 max(ϕFP, ϕTQ) ≥ 0.5        (A) 
min(ϕTP, ϕFQ) ≤ 0.5        (B) 
Since Q is probably false: 
 ϕFQ ≥ ϕTQ + 0.5 
Given that ϕFQ ≤ 1 and ϕTQ ≥ 0, we can conclude that: 
 ϕFQ ≥ 0.5         (C) 
 ϕTQ ≤ 0.5         (D) 
Combining (A) and (C), we can conclude in general that: 
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 ϕFP ≥ 0.5  
Combining (B) and (D), we can conclude in general that: 
ϕTP ≤ 0.5 
Thus DIP = ϕTP − ϕFP ≤ 0, and P can never be true. 
Property 3.14 Transitive Law 
If P → Q, Q→ R and P are all at least probably true, and if this results in Q being 
probably true also, then P → R will result in R never being false. 
Proof. 
If P → Q results in Q being probably true, then by Property 3.12 R will never be false. 
Hence P → R results in R never being false. 
Property 3.15 Distributive Law 
Given that P, Q  and R are propositions in BAF-Logic, then the following equivalences 
hold: 
 P ∧ (Q ∨ R) = (P∧ Q) ∨ (P∧ R)     (3.20a) 
P ∨ (Q ∧ R) = (P∨ Q) ∧ (P∨ R)     (3.20b) 
Proof. 
For brevity we will consider only the supporting belief masses. The refuting belief 
masses may be derived by De-Morgan’s Theorem (Property 3.6): 
For P ∧ (Q ∨ R): 
ϕT P ∧ (Q ∨ R) = min(ϕTP, max(ϕTQ, ϕTR)) 
ϕT(P∧ Q) ∨ (P∧ R) = max(min(ϕTP, ϕTQ), min(ϕTP, ϕTR)) 
Four basic cases are possible (sub-cases are listed in each case). 
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i) ϕTP < ϕTQ, ϕTR : 
In this case ϕT P ∧ (Q ∨ R) = ϕTP. Thus min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) and min(ϕTP, ϕTR) will both 
return ϕTP, and ϕT(P∧ Q) ∨ (P∧ R) = max(ϕTP, ϕTP) = ϕTP as expected. 
ii) ϕTP >ϕTQ, ϕTP < ϕTR: 
We can conclude that ϕTR > ϕTQ. max(ϕTQ, ϕTR) will therefore return ϕTR. ϕT P ∧ 
(Q ∨ R) will now be min(ϕTP, ϕTR) = ϕTP. 
For (P∧ Q) ∨ (P∧ R): 
min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) = ϕTQ, min(ϕTP, ϕTR) = ϕTP 
ϕT(P∧ Q) ∨ (P∧ R) = max(ϕTQ, ϕTP) = ϕTP, since ϕTP > ϕTQ. 
A similar argument applies if ϕTP <ϕTQ, ϕTP > ϕTR, resulting in the identical 
result of returning ϕTP.   
iii)  ϕTP >ϕTQ, ϕTR, and ϕTQ > ϕTR 
max(ϕTQ, ϕTR) will return ϕTQ. Thus ϕTP = min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) = ϕTQ,  
since ϕTP > ϕTQ. 
For (P∧ Q) ∨ (P∧ R): 
min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) = ϕTQ, min(ϕTQ, ϕTR) = ϕTR, and: 
ϕT(P∧ Q) ∨ (P∧ R) = max(ϕTQ, ϕTR) = ϕTQ.  
A similar argument follows if ϕTQ < ϕTR and ϕTQ = ϕTR. In each case ϕTQ (or 
equivalent, in the case of ϕTQ = ϕTR) is returned as the supporting belief mass. 
iv) ϕTP = ϕTQ, ϕTR > ϕTQ 
max(ϕTQ, ϕTR) = ϕTR, and  min(ϕTP, ϕTR) = ϕTP, since ϕTP = ϕTQ < ϕTR. 
  For (P∧ Q) ∨ (P∧ R): 
min(ϕTP, ϕTQ) = ϕTP  (since ϕTP = ϕTQ) 
min(ϕTP, ϕTR) = ϕTP (since ϕTR > ϕTQ = ϕTP) 
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max(ϕTP, ϕTp) = ϕTP. 
It can be easily shown in a similar manner that if ϕTQ > ϕTR, ϕT(P∧ Q) ∨ (P∧ R) = ϕT P ∧ (Q ∨ 
R) = ϕTR. Likewise also with ϕTP =ϕTR, ϕTR > ϕTQ, andϕTR< ϕTQ.  
From these cases it can be seen that P ∧ (Q ∨ R) = P ∧ (Q ∨ R). A similar chain of 
reasoning can be followed to show that P ∨ (Q ∧ R) = (P∨ Q) ∧ (P∨ R). 
Table 3.2 compares and contrasts BAF-Logic and Propositional Logic 
Property BAF-Logic Propositional Logic 
Domain [-1, 1], which –1 being 
absolutely untrue, 1 being 
absolutely true, and 0 
being ignorant of the truth. 
{True, False} 
Ease of Interpretation Open and possibly 
conflicting interpretation 
of belief masses and 
Degrees of Inclination 
Simple. A proposition is 
either true or false. 
Expressiveness Strong. BAF-Logic can 
express absolute falsehood, 
probable falsehood, 
possible falsehood, 
ignorance, possible truth, 
probable truth and absolute 
truth. 
Since truth values in BAF-
Logic are on a continuous 
range in [-1, 1], other 
intermediate interpretations 
are possible too. 
Weak. A proposition is 
either true or false. Cannot 
model intermediate states 
of belief, cannot model 
ignorance. 
Ease of Reasoning Complex. For example, the 
conjunction of two weak 
truths may result in 
ignorance rather than a 
weak truth. 
Simple, well established 
rules of two-valued 
boolean algebra. 
Associativity Same as Propositional Same as BAF-Logic 
Commutativity Same as Propositional Same as BAF-Logic 
Distributivivity Same as Propositional Same as BAF-Logic 
Idempotency Same as Propositional Same as BAF-Logic 
Absorption ∧ absorbed by ONE 
∨ absorbed by ZERO 
∧ absorbed by true 
∨ absorbed by false 
Contradiction P ∧  ¬ P  will never be 
true 
P ∧  ¬ P  is false 
Tautology P ∨  ¬ P will never be 
false 
P ∨  ¬ P is true 
Table 3.2 Comparison between BAF-Logic and Propositional Logic 
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Property BAF-Logic Propositional Logic 
De-Morgan’s Theorem Same as Propositional Same as BAF-Logic 
Negation Elimination Same as Propositional Same as BAF-Logic 
∧  - Introduction If P and Q are both 
probably true P ∧ Q cannot 
be false. 
If P and Q are true, P ∧ Q 
is true. 
∧  - Elimination Given that P ∧ Q are not 
false, then P and Q are 
individually not false. 
Given that P ∧ Q are true, 
then P and Q are 
individually true. 
∨ - Introduction Given that P is not false, P 
∨ Q cannot never be false. 
Given that P is true, P ∨ Q 
is always true. 
∨ - Elimination Given that P ∨ Q is 
probably true, and that Q is 
at least probably false, P 
can never be false. 
Given P ∨ Q is true and Q 
is false, then P is true. 
Modus Ponens If P and P → Q are 
probably true, then Q 
cannot be false. 
If P and P → Q are true, Q 
is true. 
Modus Tollens If P→Q is probably true 
and Q is probably false, 
then P cannot be true. 
If P → Q is true and Q is 
false, then P is false. 
Transitive Rule If P, P→Q results in Q 
being at least probably 
true, and if Q → R is at 
least probably true, then 
P→R will result in R never 
being false. 
If P→Q, Q→R are true, 
then P → R will result in R 
being true. 
Table 3.2 Comparison between BAF-Logic and Propositional Logic (Cont’d) 
In BAF-Logic it cannot be categorically stated that an expression is either true or false. 
Depending on the strength of the supporting and refuting belief masses it is possible 
that overall the expression is slightly true, slightly false, or we might even be ignorant 
and unable to decide the truth and falsehood of the statement. We are therefore able to 
claim, at best, that an expression cannot be false or that it cannot be true. 
3.6 Operations on BAFs 
A number of operations are defined to create and manipulate Belief Augmented 
Frames.  
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3.6.1 Inserting a Concept  
See Definition 3.3 for a formal description of a “concept”. 
insert_concept(KB, cl, ϕTcl, ϕFcl) 
Given  our knowledge base KB, insert_concept inserts a new concept named cl with 
initial supporting and refuting belief masses ϕTcl and ϕFcl respectively. The set of 
relations is initially empty. 
 ccl = (cl, ϕTcl, ϕFcl, ∅) 
 KB = KB ∪ {ccl} 
 return ccl 
 
3.6.2 Inserting a Concept with Inheritance  
insert_concept(KB, par_cl, cl, ϕTcl, ϕFcl, ϕTinh, ϕFinh) 
This inserts a new concept cl into our knowledge base KB, inheriting all relations in 
the concept labeled par_cl, establishing a parent relation from cl to par_cl, and a child 
relation from par_cl to cl. Please see Definition 3.4 for a formal description of 
“relations”. 
 pcpar_cl = find_concept(KB, par_cl) 
ccl = insert_concept(KB, cl, ϕTcl, ϕFcl,) 
inherit(ccl, pcpar_cl); Inherit relations from pcpar_cl 
KB = KB ∪ {ccl} 
 set_relation(ccl, “parent”, pcpar_cl, ,  ϕTinh, ϕFinh) 
 set_relation(pcpar_cl, “child”, ccl, ϕTinh, ϕFinh) 
 
The initial supporting and refuting belief masses ϕTcl, ϕFcl establish our belief in the 
existence of cl, while ϕTinh, ϕFinh establish our belief that cl is the child of par_cl. Note 
that we have assumed that the amount of belief and disbelief that cl is the child of   
par_cl is the same as the amount of belief and disbelief that par_cl is the parent of cl.  
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3.6.3 Deleting A Concept 
delete_concept(KB, cl) 
Removes a concept cl from the knowledge base. 
 ccl = find_concept(KB, cl) 
 ∀avcl ∈ AVcl: 
  cchild = find_concept(KB, avcl.cdcl) 
  AVchild / {avchild | avchild.cdchild = ccl} 
KB / {ccl} 
  
In addition this function searches through all the child concepts, and removes from 
those child concepts all relations to the concept to be deleted. 
3.6.4 Finding a Concept  
find_concept(KB, cl) 
Returns a concept from KB labeled cl. 
 if ∃ci ∈KB st. ci.cl == cl 
  return ci 
 else 
  return NULL 
3.6.5 Finding A Relation Between Concepts 
get_relations(ci, cj) 
Returns the relationships between two concepts ci and cj. Let av be any relation in AVi, 
and av = (al, cd, ϕTav, ϕFav) (again please see Definition 3.4 for a formal description of 
relations): 
 rel = ∅ 
  ∀av∈AVi  
  if(av.cd == cj.clj) 
   rel = rel ∪ {av} 
 return rel; 
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3.6.6 Getting All the Concepts Related to a Concept 
get_related_concepts(KB, ci) 
This operation simply gets all the concepts listed in every relation and returns them in 
a set. 
retC = ∅ 
∀av∈AVi 
 retC = retC∪ {find_concept(KB, av.cd)}  
return retC; 
3.6.7 Setting a Relation Between Concepts 
set_relation(csrc, cdst, rel_name, ϕT, ϕF) 
This operation inserts a relation called “rel_name” with concept cdst into concept csrc 
with supporting and refuting beliefs ϕT, ϕF.  Note that relations are directed and 
transitive.  
 csrc.AVsrc = csrc.AVsrc ∪ {(rel_name, cdst.cl, ϕT, ϕF)} 
3.6.8 Inherit Properties from a Concept 
inherit(cdst, csrc) 
Inherits the set of relations in csrc into cdst. This operation is simple. 
cdst . AVdst = cdst  ∪ csrc . AVsrc 
3.6.9 Inherit Common Properties from a Set of Concepts 
abstract(KB, cdst, Csrc) 
Csrc is the set of source concepts, while cdst is the destination concept which will inherit 
all the relations in common with all the concepts in Csrc. Let c0 be the first concept in 
Csrc. 
 ∀av∈ c0.AVc0: 
  result = ∅ 
  incl_flag = 1; 
An Introduction to Belief Augmented Frames 
66 
  ∀cj ∈ Csrc: 
   incl_flag &=  (av ∈ Csrc . AVsrc) 
   if(incl_flag) 
    if(av . ϕT < φTmin) 
      φTmin = av . ϕT 
    if(av . ϕF > φFmax) 
    φFmax = ϕF 
  if(incl_flag) 
   av. ϕT = ϕTmin 
   av. ϕF = ϕFmax 
   result = result ∪ {av} 
 
 cdst . AVdst = cdst . AVdst  ∪ result 
 KB = KB ∪ cdst 
This algorithm takes all the relations in c0, then sees if it is present in all the other 
concepts in Csrc. If so, the relation is added to cdst. The final outcome takes the 
minimum and maximum of all the supporting and refuting belief masses respectively, 
and thus takes a conjunction of all occurrences of a relation in all the concepts. 
3.6.10 Update Beliefs 
update(KB, cj, β) 
Given a knowledge base KB containing a concept ci, and given a concept cj that is 
identical to ci in every way except in belief masses, update will adjust the supporting 
and refuting belief masses. The factor β represents how reliable we think the new piece 
of data is relative to the old, and thus controls how much updating is done with each 
belief mass. 
 cj = find_concept(KB, cj.cl) 
  cj .ϕTj = βci . ϕTi + (1 - β) cj . ϕTj 
  cj .ϕFj = βci . ϕFi + (1 - β) cj . ϕFj 
 
The belief masses in AVj are similarly updated. 
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3.6.12 Copy Concept 
copy_concept(KBsrc, csrc, KBdest) 
This function copies a concept csrc and all related concepts from the source knowledge 
base KBsrc to the destination knowledge base KBdest. 
 if(csrc ∈ KBdest) 
   return; 
  else 
   KBdest = KBdest ∪ {csrc} 
   Crel = get_related_concepts(KBsrc, csrc) 
   ∀cj ∈ Crel: 
    copy_concept(KBsrc, cj , KBdest) 
3.6.13 Extract Context  
context(KB, KB2, KBdest) 
Given a second knowledge base KB2, context extracts all of the concepts in KB that are 
also in KB2, together with their complete set of relations and related concepts and 
inserts them into KBdest. If we view KB2 as a set of concepts related to the topic 
currently under discussion, we can view KBdest as the subset of KB that is relevant to 
the current discussion. Thus context is useful for modeling short-term memories 
containing only information that is relevant to the current topic. 
 ∀ci ∈ KB2: 
  if(ci ∈ KB) 
   copy_concept(KB, ci, KBdest)   
3.7 Computing A-Priori Belief Masses 
A-priori values for both the supporting and refuting belief masses can come from a 
variety of sources. Some suggested sources include: 
3.7.1  Common Sense Knowledge 
Humans are often “quite certain” that a proposition is true, or they may be “a little 
unsure” that a proposition is false. Fuzzy-logic style approximations [Zadeh65] can be 
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used to quantify these linguistic hedges, and these can form a-priori values for 
supporting or refuting belief masses. 
A particularly powerful feature of our approach is that while there are fixed rules for 
determining a-posteriori supporting and refuting belief masses, the a-priori masses are 
fully independent. This frees us from the problem of stating that if there is a 
probability P of an event occurring, then the probability of this event not occurring is 
(1-P) which is often counter-intuitive [Short85]. If needed both masses may even come 
from different sources. 
Thus an agent based on BAFs can first be boot-strapped with a set of hand-crafted 
belief mass values gleaned from sources like personal experience, or from survey data. 
As we learn more and more from future inputs, the belief masses can be adjusted to 
reflect our own experiences. 
The use of “common sense” will be covered in more detail in the following chapter 
when we use linguistic hedges like “most”, “all” and “few” to assign a-priori belief 
masses. 
3.7.2  Probabilities from Speech Input 
Speech recognition errors introduce uncertainties in the interpretation of what the user 
had spoken. Given a lattice of words W generated by an Automatic Speech 
Recognition (ASR) engine from an utterance U with accuracy P(W|U), and suppose 
the words are rendered into semantic units S with accuracy P(S|W), and proposition R 
is understood from S with accuracy P(R|S), then a possible a-priori belief mass 
allocation could be: 
 ϕTR = P(W|U)P(S|W)P(R|S)     (3.21a) 
  ϕFR = 1  − ϕTR       (3.21b) 
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Here is it assumed that the accuracy of the speech recognition engine (P(W|U)), 
accuracy of the semantic parser (P(S|W)), and the accuracy of the discourse 
understanding system (P(R|S)) are independent. This may not always be a sensible 
assumption since, as an example, the capabilities of the semantic parser could 
conceivably be strained by poor speech recognition performance, but it simplifies the 
problem and makes it computationally tractable.  
3.7.3 Sensory Input 
Suppose we have an array of n sensors to detect the presence of n different objects. Let 
P be the proposition that object p is present, and let sensor(x) return a number bounded 
by [0,1] indicating the likelihood of object x being present. The belief masses for P 
might be: 








pi        (3.22b) 
3.7.4 Ignorance 
It is possible that we are completely ignorant of a new fact F. In such cases the default 
belief masses may be used as initial a-priori belief mass assignments. 
 ϕTF = ϕTD        (3.23a) 
 ϕFF = ϕFD        (3.23b) 
3.8  Boundary Conditions 
In Properties 3.8, 3.10, 3.12 and 3.13 we showed four BAF-Logic properties that 
depend on our supporting facts being at least probably true (DI is at least 0.5) or 
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probably false (DI is at most –0.5). We proved analytically that as long as these 
conditions hold, then the relevant reasoning properties will also hold.  
Informally, we define a “boundary condition” as one where at least one of our 
supporting facts fails to meet this “probably true” or “probably false” (i.e. |DI|≥0.5) 
condition. In this section we present empirical results of how the four BAF-Logic 
inference rules behave under these non-ideal conditions. 
3.8.1 Assumptions and Results 
The assumptions made in this section are summarized in Table 3.3 below: 
Property Assumptions 
∧-Introduction None. We test all possible truth and 
falsehood values corresponding to -1 ≤ 
DIP, DIQ ≤ 1. 
∨-Elimination ∨-Elimination does not apply when 
DIP∨Q<0.0, or when DIQ>0.0. So these 
ranges are left out. 
Modus Ponens DIP→Q ≥ 0.0 and DIP ≥ 0.0. If DIP→Q < 
0.0, then modus ponens is irrelevant. 
Modus Tollens DIP→Q ≥ 0.5, DIQ ≤ 0.0. If either case is 
not met then Modus Tollens is irrelevant. 
Table 3.3 Assumptions 
We measured the minimum and maximum DI values at each property’s respective 
boundary condition. The results are shown in Table 3.4 below: 
Property  Boundary Condition Min DI* Max DI* Expected 
∧-Introduction DIP, DIQ ≥ 0 





DIP∧Q ≥ 0.5 
∨-Elimination DIP∨Q ≥ 0.0  





DIP ≥ 0.5 
Modus Ponens DIP→Q, DIP ≥ 0.0 





DIQ ≥ 0.5 
Modus Tollens DIP→Q ≥ 0.0, DIQ ≤ 0.0 





DIP ≤ -0.5 
Table 3.4 Results Under Boundary Conditions.  
*Values in bold indicate unexpected values. Min DI and Max DI refer to the minimal 
and maximal DI values reached for the constituent DI values specified in the Boundary 
Condition column. 
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All four properties show unexpected results under boundary conditions. P ∧ Q for 
example could potentially return a FALSE value of –1.0 even though both P and Q are 
not FALSE, and even when P → Q and P are not FALSE, Q is wrongly deduced to be 
FALSE with a large value of –1.0. 
Further experiments were conducted to determine the conditions under which the four 
reasoning rules fail. For this we recorded the range of supporting DI values under 
which erroneous conclusions were reached. The results are summarized in Table 3.5: 
Property Minimum Average DI of 
Supporting Evidence 
Maximum Average DI of 
Supporting Evidence 
∧-Introduction average(DIP, DIQ) ≥ 0.0 average(DIP, DIQ) < 0.5 
∨-Elimination average(DIP∨Q, DIQ) ≥ 0.0 average(DIP∨Q, DIQ) < 0.5 
Modus Ponens average(DIP→Q, DIP) ≥ 0.0 average(DIP→Q, DIP) < 0.5 
Modus Tollens average(DIP→Q, DIQ) ≥ 0.0 average(DIP→Q, DIQ) < 0.5
Table 3.5 Conditions Under Which BAF-Logic Produces Incorrect Conclusions 
Some of the supporting DI are negative (e.g. DIQ in ∨-Elimination), so to calculate the 
average DI we took the absolute value of each DI. This is valid as we are interested in 
the average degree of sureness in the truth or falsehood of a fact rather than the actual 
belief value. 
From Table 3.5 it can be concluded that if the average DI of the supporting evidence is 
less than 0.5, then the four properties in the table may not give valid conclusions. 
To understand the extent of the invalid conclusions we look at the points at which the 
maximum incorrectly inferred conclusion is made. For example, when DIP and DIQ are 
both not false, then DIP∧Q should also not  be false. The most incorrectly inferred belief 
value would therefore be the most negative conclusion computed for DIP∧Q. 
The results are shown in Table 3.6 for each property, together with the supporting DI 
points where these values occur. 
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Property Most Incorrectly 
Inferred Belief Value 
Supporting DI 
points where this 
occurs. 
∧-Introduction DIP∧Q = -1.0 
 
(DIP, DIQ) = 
(0.0, 0.0) 
∨-Elimination DIP = -1.0 
 
(DIP∨Q, DIQ) = 
(0.0, 0.0) 








Table 3.6 Most Incorrectly Inferred Belief Values 
From Table 3.6: 
i) The inferred value can be vary widely from the expected result (e.g. 
infer DI P∧Q = -1.0 instead of DI P∧Q ≥ 0.0 as expected. 
ii) The largest incorrectly inferred value always occurs at the point when 
the DI for both supporting evidences is 0.0.  
Since the incorrectly inferred value can be very large a reasoning engine using BAF-
Logic should take this into account when the average DI of the supporting facts is less 
than 0.5, and in particular when both DI are 0. Failing to do this may result in the 
incorrect belief values being propagated down the reasoning chain, leading to 
increasingly incorrect conclusions. 
A practical and intuitively appealing solution would be to assign the ignorance belief 
masses ϕTD and ϕFD to the inference result when the average DI of its supporting facts 
is less than 0.5. ϕTD and ϕFD are defined in Section 3.7.4.  
3.8.2 Discussion 
In this section we looked at how four BAF-Logic inference rules behave under the 
boundary condition where the DI of supporting evidences fails to meet the “probably 
true” or “probably false”. We showed empirically that while ∧-introduction, ∨-
elimination, modus ponens and modus tollens behave consistently with their 
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counterparts in bivalue logic when the “probably true” and “probably false” conditions 
are met (i.e. when the component |DI| ≥ 0.5), under boundary conditions the four rules 
may produce incorrect inferences. In particular when we are completely ignorant of the 
truth of both supporting evidences in the inference, we may infer a conclusion that is 
completely opposite to what we expect.  
A practical, simple and intuitive way to solve this is to first test the average DI of the 
supporting evidence. If the average DI is less than 0.5, assign the ignorance belief 
masses ϕTD and ϕFD to the inference. This is equivalent to saying that we don’t have 
enough information to make an informed decision on the inference. 
3.9  Summary and Future Work 
This chapter is an introduction to Belief Augmented Frames, a combination of belief 
functions and frames from classical AI. The structure of BAFs was described, and 
operations over BAFs defined. A reasoning system called BAF Logic, or BAF-Logic, 
was proposed to allow reasoning over belief values. This chapter ends with suggestions 
on obtaining a-priori belief mass values. 
Experiment results studying the dynamic behavior of BAFs in a spoken language 
understanding environment will be presented in Chapter 5. 
Future work is likely to focus on BAF-Logic. A first-order BAF Logic system would 
be particularly interesting, since first-order logic is more expressive than Propositional 
Logic and can represent information more intuitively.  
3.10  Contributions of This Chapter 
The primary contribution of this chapter is the Belief Augmented Frame, a framework 
for integrating belief functions with classical artificial intelligence (AI) frames. In 
summary, the contributions of this chapter are: 
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i) A framework for integrating beliefs and AI frames, including 
defining the structure of a frame, relations between frames, and 
the operations between the frames. 
ii) A novel approach for computing beliefs using two separate 
belief masses representing the arguments for and against a 
proposition. This approach is particularly powerful as it allows, 
for example, the supporting and refuting belief masses to come 
from different, independent masses as might happen in daily 
life. Sections 3.2 and 3.7 give examples of these. 
iii) Two measures for combining both belief masses are introduced. 
The first measure is the Degree of Inclination DI, which 
combines both masses into a single truth value defined on [-1, 
1]. The second measure is the Utility function U, which 
combines the two belief masses into a single probabilistic 
measure. DI is particularly useful for detecting conflicting facts, 
and an example of this can be seen in the update operation. U is 
useful as a probability measure for decision making. 
iv) Three measures were introduced to measure evidential conflict, 
plausibility and ignorance. These measure the quality of the 
evidence provided. Ideally EC = 0, Ig = 0, Pl = ϕT. Anything 
other than this ideal implies that the evidence conflicts, or there 
is ignorance in the evidence. 
v) A complete reasoning system (called BAF-Logic) for this dual 
belief-mass approach is introduced. Proofs are presented to 
show that standard reasoning rules still apply to BAF-Logic. A 
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side-by-side comparison with Propositional Logic is also 
presented. 
vi) A set of possible ways to compute a-priori belief masses is 
presented.  
vii) A study of the conditions under which BAF-Logic may return 
invalid conclusions is presented. We also propose a solution to 
this problem. 
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Chapter 4  Discourse Understanding with BAFs 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we explore how BAF and BAF-Logic may be used in Discourse 
Understanding. We assume that the discourse has already been rendered into logical 
clauses, and so we briefly cover in Section 4.2 various ways in which discourse may be 
processed. In Section 4.3 we present a toy problem and show how BAFs may be used 
to solve the problem. We will also see how beliefs are influenced non-monotonically 
by the introduction of new facts. In Section 4.4 we see how Dempster-Shafer Theory 
complements BAFs in computing the ignorance of the overall system. In Section 4.5 
we summarize this chapter and provide suggestions for further research, and in Section 
4.6 we summarize the contributions of this chapter.  
4.2 Discourse Processing 
Parsing and semantic analysis are the key steps to understanding natural language 
discourse, and it is at this point that natural language sentences are converted to a form 
understandable and usable by a computer. Typically the parser takes a sentence and 
generates semantic labels for each semantically important constituent of the sentence. 
The semantic labels are then processed further to produce the semantic representations 
for the sentence. 
The standard parsers used in compilers are unsuitable for natural language as natural 
language often contains disfluencies like non-words (“umm”, “ah”), poor syntax (“that 
ain’t right”) and corrections (“I want to go to Elmi – no – London”) that disrupt the 
parsing. Instead natural language parsers use robust matchers that process semantically 
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important islands of words and constituents instead of the entire sentence.  Examples 
of robust linguistic parsers include [Sleator91]. 
Simple rule-based methods for translating English to Prolog and other forms of logic 
may be found in [Bernth87], [Covin94] and [Schubert82]. 
In [Kuhn95] natural language sentences are processed using a forest of Semantic 
Classification Trees (SCT). An SCT is a specialized decision tree to process semantic 
labels returned by a parser. The SCT growing algorithms operate in particular on gaps 
and groups of ignored words. The authors demonstrate that the algorithm is highly 
resistant to errors and is able to learn semantic rules automatically from a training 
corpus. 
[Zechner98] presents a system which automatically generates shallow semantic frame 
structures automatically from conversational speech in unrestricted domains. This 
system combines methods of partial parsing (“chunking”) with the mapping of verb 
arguments onto sub-categorization frames that are extracted automatically from a 
thesaurus like Wordnet [Fellbaum98]. A “chunk” corresponds roughly to a constituent, 
and is defined in [Abney96] as a non-recursive phrase unit. Chunks are generated 
using a chart parser and the chunking algorithm in [Zechner97].  
Verb tokens are extracted from a tagged Switchboard corpus, and these are used to 
generate the initial set of sub-category frames, and sub-categorization frames are 
extracted from Wordnet using these tokens. 
Finally a semantic mapper maps the chunks onto sub-categorization frames to produce 
the semantic frames. 
[Weber95] combines symbolic methods and simple known mappings with 
connectionist approaches to produce flat semantic representations of dialog input. In 
this approach the dialog understanding system is divided into five parts (speech 
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interface, category, correction, sub-clause, and case frame). Each part consists of 
modules to perform various tasks like syntax and semantic disambiguation. Modules 
consist of a recurrent neural network (e.g. Elman networks) to learn new mappings, 
and simple rules for known mappings.  
These approaches however do not deal with anaphoric references and other practical 
difficulties in discourse understanding. Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) 
[Kamp81], [Kamp88], [Kamp93] on the other hand was introduced to resolve 
problems in interpreting inter- and intra-sentential pronouns, and in dealing with if-
then English constructions like those found in the Donkey Problem.  
The central structure in DRT is called the Discourse Representation Structure, or DRS. 
Noun phrases are rendered into referent markers and conditions imposed over these 
markers. Anaphoric references to noun phrases may then be resolved using these 
referent marks. Embedded DRSs are required to deal with if-then statements. Rules are 
enforced on the DRS to prevent anomalous discourse like “Peter owns a book. Every 
man who owns a book reads it. It has 200 pages”. The meaning of a sentence is 
represented by the changes the sentence makes to the DRS. [Hess91] surveys more 
recent extensions to DRT including plurals and quantities (including fuzzy quantities 
like “most” and “some”) and other types of pronouns like E-Type pronouns. E-type 
pronouns [Evans80] are pronouns that are preceded by a quantity, but are not bound by 
it. An example is “Few MPs came to the party but they had a good time”. The 
pronoun “they” do not necessarily refer to the MPs, and is thus not bound by few. 
[Covin89] presents an implementation of DRT using GULP and Prolog. DRSs are 
particularly easy to render into BAFs. An algorithm to do this is presented in [Tan03b]. 
We will now explore how BAFs may be used to solve a toy problem. In this problem 
the discourse is already assumed to have been processed into a form understandable by 
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the system. We will however explore how the discourse may be represented in a BAF, 
and in particular how the belief masses in the BAFs may be used to model fuzzy 
notions like “helpful”. 
4.3 Who Killed Kenny? BAF Solves a Whodunit Mystery 
In this section we explore how BAF and BAF-Logic may be used to model and 
understand discourse. We begin with an introduction in Section 4.3.1 to the problem 
being solved, and in Section 4.3.2 we show how the problem is modeled, and in 
particular we present how linguistic hedges like “close friends” and “hates him very 
much” are incorporated into BAFs. In Section 4.3.3 we introduce the evidence a piece 
at a time and explore how it affects the guilt of each of the suspects. Finally in Section 
4.3.4 we summarize the results presented. 
4.3.1 Problem Definition 
Eric, Kyle, Kenny and Stan of Cartoon Network’s South Park fame study at South 
Park Elementary, where their teacher Mr. Garrison teaches them all they ever need to 
know about life, and their lunch room cook Chef Aid whips up gourmet meals for 
them. The boys are at camp with Mr. Garrison and Stan’s Canadian one year old baby 
brother Ike. Just like every other episode of South Park, Kenny dies during the camp. 
The task of this section is to examine the evidence and finger Kenny’s likely killer.  
4.3.2 Modeling the Problem 
4.3.2.1 Modeling the South Park World 
The relevant portions of South Park may be modeled as BAFs. Figure 4.1 shows the 
partial model for our problem.  
The boys Kyle, Kenny, Stan and Eric are at camp. Mr. Garrison, who works as a 
teacher at South Park Elementary (where the boys study), is there at camp as well, 
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together with the school cook Chef Aid. Mr. Garrison is a known killer, but 
nonetheless Kenny is always very helpful to him, but it is known that Kenny once 
insulted Chef Aid. 
Kyle has a baby brother Ike who is also at camp. He is friends with Kenny, and likes 
him a lot. Kenny helped Stan with some favor in the past. For some reason Kenny 
kicked Ike and insulted Kyle. 
Eric is Kenny’s friend as well, but true to form, Eric would love to have all of Kenny’s 
food. Stan is Kenny’s close friend and likes him completely. Kenny is helpful towards 
Stan, and for some reason Stan hates sour milk.  
The true and false belief masses of each relation is shown as (ϕTP, ϕFP)  on the 
connecting lines. As an example, (ϕTStan,Friend,Kenny, ϕFStan,Friend,Kenny) = (0.75, 0.25). 
These values may be derived a-priori through background knowledge or through a 































Figure 4.1 The South Park World (Partial). 
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Relations in BAF are not reflexive. This makes sense because while Kyle may like 
Kenny, Kenny may not like Kyle. However there are some relations that are reflexive 
(e.g. Kyle is Ike’s brother implies that Ike is Kyle’s brother), and this reflexivity must 
be modeled with a separate relation. In our example, a “ike,brother,kyle” relation must 
be set up between Ike and Kyle with the appropriate belief masses to model the 
reflexivity of the brother relation. 
We now look at the membership functions used to model the relation belief masses. 
4.3.2.2 Modeling Linguistic Hedges 
Linguistic hedges like “very” and “quite” are impossible to represent in bi-valued logic 
systems, but are easy to represent in multi-valued logic systems like BAF-Logic. A set 
of functions is used to determine the a-priori belief masses of many of the relations.  
Several of the relations have binary values. For example, the fact that Ike is Kyle’s 
brother is either true or not true. It is unnatural to model brother as a multi-valued 
relationship. Intuitively, what would be the difference between a brother grade of 1.0 
and a grade of 0.75? Thus although it is known that Ike is Canadian and adopted, and 
is therefore not Stan’s biological brother, we choose to continue to model this 
relationship as a binary one.  
Several other relationships are more amenable to multi-valued representation. The 
friend relationship for example can be modeled as Sfriend = {“best”, “close”, “good”, 
“casual”, “acquaintance”, “stranger”}, where Sfriend is the fuzzy set of friendship 
types. Best friend takes a score of 1.0, and “stranger” takes a score of 0.0. The 
intervening elements will be assigned monotonically decreasing scores to represent 
that they are lesser grades of friendships. Following the conventions used in Fuzzy 
Sets, the Friend set may be modeled as: 
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Sfriend = {1.0/“best”, 0.9/“close”, 0.6/“good”, 0.4/“casual”,  
0.1/“acquaintance”, 0.0/“stranger” }. 
The like set is modeled as: 
Slikes = {1.0/“completely”, 0.8/“very much”, 0.6/“a lot”, 0.4/“somewhat”,  
0.2/“a little”/, 0.0/“indifferent”} 
The insult set is modeled on the severity of the insult on a five-point scale. 
Sinsults = {1.0/5, 0.9/4, 0.6/3, 0.3/2, 0.1/1, 0.0/0} 
Likewise the helped set is modeled on Kenny’s helpfulness as perceived by the party 
he is helping. This gives us the set: 
Shelped = {1.0/“invaluable”, 0.75/“very helpful”, 0.5/“helpful”,  
0.25/“unhelpful”, 0.0/“uncooperative”}. 
Ike’s baby belief mass is pegged to his age. Everyone agrees that a “newborn” is a 
baby, but that a 5-year old is probably a toddler rather than a baby. This gives us the 
following (possible) fuzzy set. 
Sbaby= {1.0/“newborn”, 0.75/1, 0.50/2, 0.2/3, 0.0/4}. 
Fuzzy-set operations like Dil (Dilate) and Conc (Concentrate) (See [Zadeh65] for more 
details) can be used to create more sophisticated linguistic hedge sets. For example, we 
can apply the conc operation if we wanted to produce a very-friend fuzzy set. The conc 
operation squares all the membership grades, causing the smaller grades to shrink 
faster than the larger grades, allowing us to potentially reduce the set to just the larger 
members.  
Svery-friend = {1.0/”very best”, 0.81/“very close”, 0.36/“very good”, 0.16/“very  
casual”, 0.01/“very acquaintance”, 0.0/“very stranger” }. 
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This gives us the grades for “very best”, “very close”, “very good”, “very casual”, 
“very acquaintance” and “very stranger”. The membership scores for all grades of 
friends is decreased, except for the “best friend” grade which remains constant at 1.0.  
This thesis will not use any of the fuzzy-set transformations like conc and dil. 
The fuzzy-set membership grades are always assigned to the true belief mass of the 
relation. For example, Kyle is close friends with Kenny, and we assign ϕTkyle,friend,kenny = 
0.75, based on the score for “close” in Sfriend. For convenience we assign the inverse of 
this grade to ϕFkyle,friend,kenny, giving us ϕFkyle,friend,kenny = 1 – 0.75 = 0.25. Since ϕF is by 
definition independent of ϕT, other values of ϕF are possible. 
Background knowledge may also be used to assign belief masses. For example, if it is 
known that Ike was present for three days of a five-day camp, then the belief mass ϕ 
T
ike,at,camp = 0.6, and, for convenience,  
ϕ Fike,at,camp = 1 - ϕ Tike,at,camp 
   = 0.4 
4.3.2.3 Modeling the BAFs 
The BAFs are modeled as Prolog clauses. Two types of clauses are defined. The 
concept clauses define the existence of a person, object, idea or concept, while the rel 
clauses define the relations between clauses. The concept clause is defined as: 
  concept(con_name, ϕTcon_name, ϕFcon_name). 
Here ϕTcon_name and ϕFcon_name are our supporting and refuting masses respectively that 
the concept represented by  con_name exists. 
The rel clause is defined as: 
  rel(lhs, rs, rhs,  ϕTlhs,rs,rhs, ϕFlhs,rs,rhs). 
Again ϕTlhs,rs,rhs and ϕFlhs,rs,rhs are our supporting and refuting masses that the 
relationship rs exists between concepts represented by lhs and rhs. To allow us to 
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represent the Prolog clauses more clearly, in this chapter we will depart slightly from 
the notations used in Chapter 3 (in particular Section 3.6). 
For our toy problem it is assumed that we do not doubt the existence of anyone or 
anything in our world, and we therefore assign the belief mass (1.0, 0.0) to all concept 
clauses. 
Kyle’s relations in Figure 5.1 are modeled as: 
  concept(kyle, 1.0, 0.0). 
   rel(kyle,at,camp,1.0, 0.0) 
rel(kyle, brother,ike, 1.0, 0.0) 
rel(kyle,friend,kenny, 0.9, 0.1) 
rel(kyle, likes, kenny, 0.9, 0.1) 
4.3.2.4 Modeling Rules 
Modeling BAFs only allows us to concepts and their thematic relations. This is useful 
if we want to find the existing relations between objects. We would also want to infer 
and introduce new relation, and since BAF is a non-monotonic reasoning system, we 
would also want to infer new properties about existing relations and modify these 
existing relations accordingly. We require rules to do this. 
The rules are modeled as standard Prolog Horn clauses. We will again use the rel and 
concept clauses to define rules that control the relationship between concepts, and rules 
that control the existence of the concept itself. Unlike the rel and concept clauses used 
to model BAFs, the clauses used to model rules have an additional flag, which 
indicates whether this rule supports or refutes the relation: 
 concept(con_name, ref_flag, TV, FV) :- concept(.), rel(.), rel(.). 
 rel(lhs, rs, rhs, ref_flag, TV, FV) :- rel(.), rel(.), rel(.). 
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Here concept(.) and rel(.) are generalized shorthand notations for BAF clauses as 
defined in the previous section (i.e. concept(.) may represent concept(kyle, 1.0, 0.0)). 
We define ref_flag = 0 when the rule supports the concept’s existence or the relation, 
and 1 when the rule refutes this existence or relation. TV and FV are Prolog variables 
that are used to store the evaluated scores for ϕT  and ϕF respectively. Implementation-
wise, ref_flag is actually used by the external application using the Prolog engine to 
perform BAF-Logic reasoning, rather than by the Prolog clauses on the right hand side 
of the rule.  
For example, given the following set of rules: 
 concept(X, 0, TV1, FV1) :- … 
 concept(X, 1, TV2, FV2) :- … 
 concept(X, 0, TV3, FV3) :- … 
When the external application computes the overall score for X, it will compute it as: 
 TVX = max(TV1, FV2, TV3) 
 FVX = min(FV1, TV2, FV3) 
The truth value for X is therefore the conjunction of the three rules. We reversed the 
supporting and refuting values for the second rule as it actually refutes the existence of 
X. We will touch upon this again shortly, with regards to clauses on the right hand side 
of the rule. 
The ref_flag value on the left hand side of the rule are not needed on the right hand 
side and do not appear on that side. This allows the concept and rel clauses on the right 
hand side of the rules to remain as defined in the previous sections, which is useful 
since they test the existing facts in the knowledge base as defined by our BAFs. 
Likewise when a new BAF is asserted to the knowledge base, it will not be asserted 
with a ref_flag value. i.e. ref_flag appears exclusively in rules. 
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Each Horn clause is a conjunction of all the clauses on the right hand side. Thus to 
compute the final score for ϕTcon_name = TV or ϕTlhs,rs,rhs = TV, we need to take the 
minimum of all the ϕT scores on the right hand side. To compute the score for 
ϕFcon_name = FV or ϕFlhs,rs,rhs = FV, we need to take the maximum of all the ϕF scores on 
the right hand side.  
A complete rule may therefore be defined as: 
rel(kyle,hates,kenny, 0, TV, FV):-rel(kenny, insults,kyle, TV1, FV1),  
rel(kenny,hates,kyle, TV2, FV2), minl([TV1, TV2], TV),  
maxl([FV1, FV2], FV). 
Here minl and maxl are pre-defined Prolog functions that find the minimum and 
maximum members of a list respectively. 
To model NOT relations in the right-hand-side, we reverse the truth and false values, 
as per the definition of negation in BAF-Logic (Definition 3.10). Thus if a relation 
rel(a,b,c,0,TV,FV) includes a NOT rel(d,e,f,TV1,FV1), this is modeled as: 
 rel(a,b,c,0,TV,FV):-rel(d,e,f,TV1,FV1), rel(g,h,i, TV2, FV2),  
minl([FV1, TV2], TV), maxl([TV1, FV2], FV). 
We now look at how we can incorporate knowledge that supports and refutes an 
existence or relationship. For brevity, we will use single capital letters to represent the 
Prolog clauses.   
Suppose we had three clauses A, B, C that support a claim X, and a single clause P that 
refutes it. We can then evaluate XT as: 
  XT :- (A ∨ B ∨ C) ∧ ¬ P. 
We can evaluate XF as the negation of XT. So we have: 
  XF :- ¬ XT. 
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Applying De-Morgan’s Theorem (Property 3.6), we obtain: 
  XF :- (¬ A ∧ ¬ B ∧ ¬ C) ∨  P 
Thus to evaluate the belief masses ϕTX and ϕFX: 
  ϕTX =min(max(ϕTA, ϕTB, ϕTC), ϕFP) 
  ϕFX =max(min(ϕFA, ϕFB, ϕFC), ϕTP) 
We have now established how to model our problem as BAFs, how to assign the 
relationship belief masses using fuzzy sets and background knowledge, how to model 
BAFs and rules as Prolog clauses, and finally how to evaluate the overall truth and 
falsehood of a clause, taking into consideration both arguments supporting and refuting 
the clause. We can now proceed to see how BAFs can solve the mystery of Kenny’s 
death. For this chapter we will use β = 0.0 for updating the belief values. i.e. we place 
absolutely no faith in the information we currently have, and absolute faith in the new 
information that we receive. See Section 3.6.10 for more information on the role of β. 
4.3.3 Examining the Evidence 
Table 4.5 show the rules that we use to determine the suspects in the case, while Table 
4.6 show the facts of the case. In Table 4.6 the belief masses are shown in brackets 
(e.g. (0.4, 0.6)). 
Rule Criteria 
X killed Kenny X is a suspect, AND  
X attended the camp 
X is a suspect X is a convicted killer, X is angry with 
Kenny, X has a motive, OR 
X hates Kenny 
X is NOT a suspect X likes Kenny, OR 
X is a baby, OR 
X is not a convicted killer, X is not angry 
with Kenny, X has no motive 
Table 4.1 Inference Rules for Our Case  




X has a motive X hate Kenny, OR 
X wants to eat Kenny’s food, OR 
X works at the school Kenny studies at, 
namely South Park Elementary. 
X is angry with Kenny Kenny insulted X, OR 
Kenny kicked X, OR 
Kenny kicked Y, and Y is the brother of 
X. 
X is NOT angry with Kenny Kenny bought something from X. 
X hates Kenny X does not like Kenny 
X does not like sour milk 
Table 4.1 Inference Rules for Our Case (Cont’d) 
Table 4.2 shows the facts that are known. Both relevant and irrelevant facts are 
included. 
S/N Fact 
1. Ike is at camp (0.6, 0.4) 
2. Mr. Garrison is at camp (0.75, 0.25) 
3. Kyle is at camp (1.0, 0.0) 
4. Eric is at camp (1.0, 0.0) 
5. Stan is at camp (1.0, 0.0) 
5. Kenny is at camp (1.0, 0.0) 
6. Chef Aid is at camp (0.25, 0.75) 
7. Kyle is best friends with Kenny (0.9, 0.1) 
8. Stan likes Kenny completely (1.0, 0.0) 
9. Stan is a close friend of Kenny (0.75, 0.25) 
10. Kenny studies at South Park (1.0, 0.0) 
11. Mr. Garrison is a killer (0.6, 0.4) 
12. Kenny was very helpful to Mr. Garrison (0.75, 0.25) 
13. Eric is friends with Kenny (0.5, 0.5) 
14. Kenny insulted Kyle (0.75, 0.25) 
15. Kenny was helpful to Stan (0.5, 0.5) 
16. Ike is a 1 year old baby (0.75, 0.25) 
17. Eric wants Kenny’s Food (0.7, 0.3) 
18. Stan hates sour milk (0.75, 0.25) 
19. Kenny kicked Ike (0.8, 0.2) 
20. Kyle is Ike’s brother (1.0, 0.0) 
21. Mr. Garrison works at South Park (1.0, 0.0) 
22. Chef Aid works at South Park (1.0, 0.0) 
23. Kenny insulted Chef Aid (0.9, 0.1) 
Table 4.2 Facts of Our Case  
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Table 4.2 will be useful when we analyze the results for each of our suspects. We 
begin first Stan. Figure 4.2 shows the Degree of Inclination that Stan killed Kenny, as 
a function of clause insertions: 

















    Figure 4.2 DI History for Stan 
Figure 4.2 shows the degree of inclination that Stan is the killer (DIstan). DIstan dips to –
0.5 at clause 9: 
  Stan is a close friend of Kenny (0.75, 0.25) 
We trace through the rules to see how this number is derived: 
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Clause Unification Conclusion 
- - rel(stan, friend, kenny,   
    0.75, 0.25) 





rel(X, likes, kenny, 0,  






rel(stan,hates,kenny,   














      0.75). 
 
- - rel(stan,at,camp,1.0,   
     0.0) 
rel(X,kill,kenny, 0, TV, FV):- 
rel(X,is,suspect,TV1, FV1),    
rel(X, at, camp, TV2, FV2), minl([TV1,TV2], 











rel(X,kill,kenny,0,   
      0.25, 0.75) 
Table 4.3 Trace for DIStan  
The final outcome is rel(stan,kill,kenny, 0.25, 0.75). Therefore: 
DIstan,kill,kenny  =ϕTstan,kill,kenny  –  ϕFstan,kill,kenny 
  = 0.25 – 0.75 
  = -0.5. 
However the situation changes at Clause 18: 
 Stan hates sour milk (0.75, 0.25) 
A trace through the clauses shows how this new piece of evidence affects the outcome. 
Clause 9 resolves to rel(stan,kill,kenny,0.25, 0.75). Clause 18 will resolve as: 
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Clause Unification Conclusion 
- - rel(stan,hates, 
    sourmilk 
     0.75, 0.25) 
rel(X,hates,kenny, 0, TV, FV):- 







rel(X,has,motive, 0, TV,FV):- 





motive, 0, 0.75,  
0.25) 
rel(X,is,suspect, 0, TV, FV):- 





0,  0.75, 0.25) 
rel(X,kill,kenny,0,TV,FV):- 
rel(X, has, motive, 0, TV1, FV1), 
rel(X,at,camp, 0, TV2, FV2),  











      0.75, 0.25) 
Table 4.4 Trace for DIStan  
There are now two competing beliefs for rel(stan, kill, kenny): 
 rel(stan,kill,kenny, 0, TV,FV):- rel(stan,kill,kenny, 0, 0.25, 0.75); 
rel(stan,kill,kenny, 0, 0.75, 0.25), 
maxl([0.25,0.75], TV), minl([0.75, 0.25], FV) 
This results in {TV/0.75, FV/0.25}, giving us a new DIstan,kill,kenny = 0.5.  
Figure 4.3 shows how the DI values evolve for Mr. Garrison: 
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Figure 4.3 DI History for Mr. Garrison 
The change in DIgarrison,kill,kenny due to  Clause 11 is easily explained by a trace we had 
done earlier with Stan. Resolving Clause 11 gives us rel(garrison, kill, kenny, 0.6, 0.4), 
and a resulting DIgarrison, kill, kenny = 0.2. 
We now consider Clause 12: 
 Kenny was very helpful to Mr. Garrison (0.75, 0.25) 
We trace the resolution for this: 
Clause Unification Conclusion 
  rel(kenny, help,  
     garrison,0.75, 0.25)
rel(X,likes,kenny, 0, TV, FV):-  
rel(kenny,help, X, TV, FV) 
{X/garrison, 
  TV/0.75, 
  FV/0.25} 
rel(garrison, likes,  




  TV/0.25, 
  FV/0.75} 
rel(garrison, hates,  




  TV/0.25, 
  FV/0.75} 
rel(garrison, has,  
motive, 0.25, 0.75). 
Table 4.5 Trace for DIGarrison (Cont’d)
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Clause Unification Conclusion 
rel(X,kill,kenny,0,TV,FV):-                                  
rel(X,has,motive,0,TV1,FV1),  
rel(X,at,camp,0, TV2, FV2),  
minl([TV1,TV2],TV)                                           











kenny, 0.25, 0.75). 
Table 4.5 Trace for DIGarrison  
We now trace the resolution for Clause 21: 
  rel(garrison, worksat,  
southpark, 1.0, 0.0). 
  rel(kenny,studiesat, 
southpark, 1.0, 0.0). 
rel(X,has,motive,0,TV,FV):-
rel(X,worksat,Y,TV1,FV1), 
rel(kenny,studiesat, Y, _, _). 
{X/garrison, 
 Y/southpark, 
  TV/1.0, 
  FV/0.0} 
rel(garrison,has, 
motive,0, 1.0, 0.0). 
rel(X,kill,kenny,0,TV,FV):-                                  
rel(X,has,motive,0,TV1,FV1), 
rel(X,at,camp,0, TV2, FV2), 
minl([TV1, TV2], TV)  







1.0}       
FV/max{0.25,0
.0} 
rel(garrison, kill,  
kenny, 0.75, 0.25). 
Table 4.6 Trace for DIGarrison (Clause 21) 
We thus now have 3 possible outcomes for rel(garrison, kill, kenny, 0, TV, FV): 
rel(garrison, kill, kenny, 0, TV, FV) :- rel(garrison, kill, kenny, 0.6, 0.4);  
                                                           rel(garrison, kill, kenny,0.25, 0.75);  
                                                           rel(garrison, kill, kenny, 0.75, 0.25). 
 
Since this is a disjunction, we unify TV and FV as {TV/max{0.6, 0.25, 0.75}, 
FV/min{0.4, 0.25, 0.25}}, giving us  {TV/0.75, FV/0.25}}. Thus after introducing 
Clause 11, we resolve: 
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  rel(garrison, kill, kenny, 0, 0.75, 0.25). 
Giving us a DIgarrison,kill,kenny of 0.5, as shown in Mr. Garrison’s DI History. 
The DI graphs for the remaining suspects may be similarly explained. Table 4.7 
summarizes the final DI values for all the suspects: 
 Kyle Stan Eric Chef Aid Mr. 
Garrison 
DIX,kill,kenny -0.8 0.5 0.4 -0.5 0.5 
Table 4.7 Final DI Values for the Suspects 
From Table 4.7 Mr. Garrison and Stan are our main suspects. Mr. Garrison is almost 
certainly a convicted killer, and since anyone who works in South Park Elementary 
wants to kill Kenny, he has strong motives. Stan appears to like Kenny, but his strong 
distaste for sour milk makes him one of the leading suspects in the case. 
4.3.4 Discussion 
In this section we saw how BAF may be applied to solve problems. The BAFs and 
associated reasoning rules are encoded as Prolog clauses, and a Prolog engine was 
used to solve the problem. There are some quirks in our model. For example, we stated 
that anyone who works in the same school that Kenny studies at would want to kill 
him. We then defined this rule as: 
rel(X,has ,motive ,0,TV,FV):- rel(X, worksat, Y, TV, FV), rel(kenny,studiesat, Y, _, _). 
This ties X’s desire to kill Kenny directly to how much he works at the school. This 
clearly is not a sensible assumption, but it was made here to simplify modeling the 
problem. A more sensible approach would be to assign a fixed score, regardless of how 
much X works at the school: 
 rel(X,has ,motive,0 ,0.3, 0.75):- rel(X, worksat, Y, TV, FV),  
                                                                rel(kenny,studiesat, Y, _, _). 
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Thus we are somewhat unsure if X has a motive for killing Kenny if he works at the 
school (ϕTX,has,motive = 0.3), but we are almost certain that if X would not kill Kenny 
(ϕFX,has,motive = 0.75). Alternatively a function motivefun can be defined to assign a 
value in the range of [0, 1] to ϕTX,has,motive  based on DIworksat. 
rel(X,has,motive,0,TV,FV):-rel(X,worksat,Y,TV1,FV1),  
                                            rel(kenny,studiesat, Y, _, _), 
            DI is TV1-FV1, motivefun(DI, TV), FV is 1-TV. 
There are in fact an infinite number of ways to define the scores ϕTX,has,motive and 
ϕFX,has,motive (represented here by TV, FV). This gives us great flexibility in modeling 
rules. 
4.3 BAF and Dempster-Shafer Theory 
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) [Demp67], [Shaf76] is a well established method for 
integrating new evidence into a body of evidence. DST has a strong mathematical 
formalism, and a large body of literature has evolved around it.  
DST defines beliefs across a set of objects in its environment. It computes belief 
measures across subsets (and intersections of subsets) of this environment, and this 
unfortunately that makes DST computationally intensive [Haenni03]. This is especially 
true when compared with computationally light reasoning systems like BAF and 
Probabilistic Argumentation Systems (PAS), which rely on min-max or add-multiply 
operations. These are fast and lightweight compared to sub-set or set-intersection 
operations used in DST. BAF has a further advantage in that it integrates a multi-
valued reasoning system into a frame-based system, thus providing for structure to the 
belief data. BAF-Logic, the underlying reasoning system in BAF, is also sound and 
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equivalent (in terms of reasoning rules) to bi-value reasoning systems under most 
conditions. 
While BAFs are able to compute ignorance for a single relation (or a single concept), 
there is no mathematical framework defined to compute the overall ignorance of the 
system. One possible use of ignorance would be to ascertain the quality (or coverage) 
of the facts with respect to the relation being examined (in this case the people 
suspected of killing Kenny). The less ignorance there is after all the facts or evidence 
are integrated, the more “complete” the facts or evidence are.  
DST provides a mathematically sound method for computing this, and in this section 
we explore how this can be achieved. Of course instead of computing ignorance we 
can compute plausibility, dubiety, etc. 
4.4.1 Integrating BAFs with Dempster-Shafer Theory 
BAFs model concepts and the relations between concepts. Existence and relationship 
scores are computed using BAF-Logic and updated accordingly. Concepts within 
BAFs can thus be partitioned according to their relations, and the members of each 
partitions can be modeled as (possibly singleton) DST sets.  
The belief mass for each set is also trivial to derive. While BAFs perform reasoning 
based on two belief masses (one for supporting the proposition, one for refuting), the 
Utility Function U (Definition 3.6) combines the two belief masses into a single belief 
measure in the range of [0, 1], which is ideal for use in DST. 
Thus to interface BAFs with DST: 
i) Partition the concepts ci in the BAFs according to some relation rij to 
other concepts cj.  
ii) Insert the elements of these partitions as sets sk in the DST reasoning 
system. 
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iii) Assign the Utility score Uci, rij, cj as the weight of the set sk. 
iv) Apply Dempster’s Rule of Combination to integrate the new sets into 
existing evidences in the DST system. 
We now use our Whodunit problem as an example. 
4.4.2 An Example 
We will integrate DST into our toy problem of the previous section. Since we are 
interested in finding the likeliest suspect, the rel(X,kill,Kenny, TV, FV) relation will be 
a good starting point. Our primary objective for integrating DST with BAF at this point 
would be to have a mathematically sound framework for assessing the increase of 
knowledge (or correspondingly, a decrease in ignorance) about the suspects as more 
clauses are inserted into the knowledge base. 
After each clause is inserted: 
i) We create a group of singleton sets sk, with each set containing exactly 
one suspect. 
ii) We  compute the supporting and refuting belief masses for this suspect. 
For example, for the kth singleton set sk containing suspect x, we find 
ϕTx,kill,kenny and ϕFx,kill,kenny from the rule rel(x, kill, kenny, ϕTx,kill,kenny, 
ϕFx,kill,kenny) (i.e. from the corresponding TV and FV values). We 
compute the utility function for these two belief masses, and assign the 
utility function as the belief mass for the singleton set. 
iii) Integrate the singleton sets into the DST system. 
iv) Compute the overall ignorance of the suspects after every suspect has 
been inserted. 
Step iv) will thus tell us the total degree of ignorance after taking into consideration 
what we know about every suspect.  
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Figure 4.4 shows how the ignorance level falls as each new clause is inserted. The 






















Figure 4.4 Average Ignorance Against Clause Inserted 
The decline in ignorance is not uniform, but instead corresponds to points where more 
knowledge is gained about at least one of the suspects. This is sensible since the Utility 
function for a suspect changes as relevant clauses tell us more about this suspect. Since 
the Ignorance value in the DST is based on Utilities, it must also change. Graphically 
this can be seen in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5 Ignorance vs. Change in Utilities 
Figure 4.5 superimposes the ignorance values on the change in utility values for each 
suspect. It can be seen that each time there is a change in utility value (and 
correspondingly a change in the belief value) for a particular suspect, the level of 
ignorance declines, reflecting an increase in knowledge in our system as more and 
more clauses are inserted. The static portions of the ignorance curve correspond to 
clauses that do not affect the belief values of any of the suspects in any way, and hence 
contribute nothing to the overall knowledge of the suspects. Thus these clauses are 
irrelevant in building our knowledge about the suspects. 
4.5  Summary and Recommendations for Further Work 
In this chapter we explore how to model a discourse understanding problem using 
BAFs. In particular we showed how fuzzy-sets and fuzzy operations can be used to 
model linguistic hedges like “close friend” and “very helpful”.  We also presented our 
method for representing BAFs and reasoning rules as Prolog clauses, and presented a 
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toy problem as a concrete example of a BAF implementation to perform discourse 
understanding. 
One measure of interest would be the overall ignorance (or knowledge level) of a BAF 
system. Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) provides a rigorous and mathematically sound 
way to do this, and we showed how BAF can be integrated with DST to provide 
information on the overall ignorance, evidential interval etc. of the BAF system as new 
clauses are inserted and existing clauses are modified.  
In the following chapter we apply BAF and BAF-Logic to a completely different class 
of problems; the text classification problem. 
4.6  Contributions of this Chapter 
This chapter three main contributions: 
i) It describes in detail how discourse may be modeled in BAF and BAF-
Logic, and in particular how to model fuzzy notions of helpful and 
baby. 
ii) We present a toy problem modeled as a BAF. We showed how BAFs 
and reasoning rules may be modeled as clauses in Prolog, allowing us to 
use the powerful reasoning abilities of Prolog. 
iii) We explored briefly how BAFs may be interfaced with Dempster-
Shafer Theory, a mathematically rigorous and sound method for 
integrating evidence scores. In particular we use DST to measure the 
overall ignorance of our BAF system as more clauses are inserted. 
Integrating DST with BAFs will open new avenues of research on 
BAFs. For example we can now apply evidential interval reasoning 
methods to BAF relations by converting BAF relations into DST sets.  
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Chapter 5  Applying BAFs to Text Classification 
5.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter we apply BAFs to the text classification problem. This chapter is not 
intended to be a detailed treatment of the text classification problem, which is an 
immense field of research worthy of several doctoral theses. Instead the primary 
objective here is to study how BAFs might be applied to this problem. Experiment 
results comparing text classification using BAFs and BAF-Logic to Naïve Bayes 
Model are presented and discussed. 
In addition we also conduct experiments to study the effect on text classification 
accuracy of replacing BAF-Logic within BAF with Probabilistic Argumentation 
Systems or PAS.  
In Section 5.2 we introduce the text classification problem and in Section 5.3 we 
formulate the text classification problem as a Naïve Bayes, BAF-Logic and PAS 
model. In Section 5.4 we present experiment results, and in section 5.5 we analyze the 
results of our experiment. In section 5.6 we summarize the contributions of this 
chapter. Finally in section 5.7 we  make recommendations for further work. 
5.2 The Text Classification Problem 
In the text classification problem text documents (typically news articles) are 
automatically sorted and classified into several different categories. This is useful 
when labeling and dealing with very large text collections such as those in a library or 
an archive. Extensive research has been done on text classification, e.g. in [Cohen98] 
and [Nigam00]. Attempts have also been made to incorporate background knowledge 
to improve classification performance [Zelik01], [Zelik02]. We will now model the 
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text classification problem as a Propositional Logic problem and proceed to solve it 
using BAF-Logic and PAS. 
5.3 Formulating the Text Classification Problem 
In this chapter the Text Classification Problem is formulated as a Bayesian relation, 
and as a logical relation to be solved using BAF-Logic and PAS. In the following four 
sections we cover this in greater detail. 
 5.3.1 Keyword Selection 
A stop-list is used to remove spurious words from the list of words extracted 
from a documents. The words are then stemmed using a Porter Stemmer. 
Stemmed words occurring fewer than τ times (τ nominally set to 3) are 
removed to produce the final set of keyword terms tijk, which is the kth keyword 
term of the jth document of the ith class. 
 5.3.2 Naïve Bayes Classifier 











Here p(ci|tijk) is the probability that a document Dj belongs to class ci given that 
a the kth document term tijk is observed in the document. p(tj | ci) and p(tj) are 
observed from the training data and are derived with the following relations: 
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)(      (5.4) 
count(tijk) returns the number of times the kth term tijk of document j of class i 
occurs. The numerator in (5.2) therefore counts the number of times the term 
appears in class i. The denominator gives the total count of all the words in the 
class. The numerator in (5.3) gives the total number of times term tijk occurs in 
all classes, while the denominator gives the total number of terms in all 
documents and classes. Likewise the numerator in (5.4) gives us the number of 
terms occuring in class i  while the denominator gives us the total number of 
terms in our lexicon. Equation 5.4 therefore gives us the probability of class i. 
Equation 5.1 gives the probability of a class i given a particular term tj. The 
Naïve Bayes classifier assumes that all terms are independent. The probability 
of a document Dk made of terms tj belonging to class ci is given by: 
  p(ci|Dk) = ∏ j jijk ctp )|(  
 
(5.5)
The term p(tijk)  is common across all classes and may be omitted. The 
document belongs to the class with the largest p(ci|Dk). 
5.3.3 BAF-Logic 
In BAF-Logic the jth document Dij in the document class ci is taken to be a 
conjunction of terms tk: 
  Dij = tij0∧ tij1 ∧ …∧ tij(n-1) (5.6)
 
Each term and document is related by a set of relation  
  Rijk = {(Dij, term, tk, ϕTijk, ϕFijk) | tk is a term in Dij}. (5.7)
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In addition, given a set of documents D in class ci, we apply the abstract 
operator (see Section 3.9) on all R ijk to produce a set of relations characterizing 
the class ci. We call this set of vectors the characteristic vector vi of class i. 
   vi = (Si0 , Si1, Si2, …, Si(m-1)) (5.8)
 
Here each Sik is the relation 
  Sik = {(ci, term, tk, ϕTik, ϕFik) | tk occurs in at least α% of    
                                             documents Dj in class ci} 
(5.9) 
 ϕTik = minj ϕTijk (5.10)
 ϕFik = maxlmaxj ϕTljk, l ≠ i (5.11)
 
For text classification the abstract operator (see Section 3.9) is modified so that 
a term is extracted for the class if it occurs in a minimum of α% (see Equation 
5.9) of all the documents in the class, instead of having to occur in all 
documents. If α = 100 then this gives us the original definition of the abstract 
operator. The percentage α is called the abstraction degree and represents how 
strictly we would want to determine whether a relation characterizes the class 
the document occurs in. It also controls the size of the reference lexicon. Larger 
α implies that the term must occur in more files, and hence there will be fewer 
terms in the lexicon. 
ϕTik is the mass that supports the fact that term tk implies class ci, while ϕFik 
supports the fact that term tk implies some other class cl. i.e. it refutes the fact 
that the term tk implies the class ci. 
Sik then represents the belief that term tk implies the class ci. To classify an 
unseen document Du, we derive the keyword terms tunk, k. We can derive the 
following masses that support and refute Dunk belonging to class ci: 
  ϕTi, unk = min(ϕTi0, ϕTi1, ϕTi2, …, max(ϕFi0, ϕFi0,…)) (5.12)
 ϕFi,unk = max(ϕFi0, ϕFi1, ϕFi2, …, min(ϕTi0, ϕTi0,…)) (5.13)
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The degree of inclination Di,unk is given by its usual definition: 
  DIi, unk  = ϕTi, unk − ϕFi, unk (5.14)
 
A document is classified in class win by maximizing DIi,unk: 
  win = argmaxi DIi, unk  (5.15)
 
5.3.4 Probabilistic Argumentation Systems 
In PAS we again represent a document Dij in class i with a conjunction of 
terms. 
  Dij = ∧k tijk (5.16)
 
Where the term tijk is the kth keyword term in document Dij 
An identical abstraction operation is performed on a set of documents to 
produce a characteristic vector vi for every class ci. 
To classify a document Dunk consisting of keyword terms tunk,k, we derive the 
following argument: 
A term tk supports that the document Dunk belongs to class ci if it occurs 
in abstraction vector vi and not in vj, j ≠ i. 
 To put it in Prepositional Argumentation System form: 
  qs(Dk in class i) = ti0 ∧ ti1 ∧ … ti,n-1 ∧  ¬ (tj0 ∧ tj1 ∧ … tj,,n-1),  
                              j ≠ i 
(5.17)
 Deriving the degree of support: 
  p(qs(Dk in class i)) = Πk p(tik)Σk (1.0 – p(tlk)) l ≠ i (5.18)
 
Since it isn’t contradictory for a term to appear in several classes, the most 
sensible value for p(qs(⊥)) would be 0. Using this and equation 2.10 we obtain: 
Applying BAFs to Text Classification 
106 






qspinclassiDqsp k  
    = p(qs(Dk in class i))   (5.19) 
The document belongs in the class with the largest degree of support. 
Having modeled the classification problem as a Naïve Bayesian Classifier, BAF-Logic 
and PAS model, we proceeded to evaluate the classification performance under each 
model. The results are presented in the following section. 
5.4 Experiment Results 
The performance of the Naïve Bayes, BAF-Logic and PAS classifiers were evaluated 
on a medium and then a large classification tasks. In the first task the classifiers were 
trained on 2,000 Reuters news articles divided into 25 classes, and were made to 
classify these articles as well as a further 500 unseen articles. In the second the 
classifiers were trained on 19,600 Newsnet articles divided gleaned from 20 News 
Groups. The classifiers were then evaluated based on the 19,600 training articles 
(inside test) and the 400 unseen articles (outside test). Details of these tasks are 
presented in the following sections. 
5.4.1 Task I – Reuters News Articles 
In addition we evaluate the performance of the classifiers under various degrees 
of abstraction and with Jeffreys-Perks (JPerks) smoothing given by: 







Where count(tik) gives the number of occurrences of term k in class i, n is the 
total number of terms in class i and m is the number of unique words in class i. 
Jeffreys-Perks smoothing is similar to Add One (or Laplace) smoothing, but 
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gives slightly better performance for the Naïve Bayes Classifier. However both 
Jeffreys-Perks and Add One give identical results under BAF-Logic and PAS. 
Figure 5.1 shows the inside-test performance of the three classifiers under 
various Degrees of Abstraction: 

























Figure 5.1 Inside Test Results – Reuters 
In Figure 5.1 we see that the BAF-Logic and PAS approaches consistently 
outperform the Naïve Bayes approach. We conjecture that this is due to both 
BAF and PAS approaches evaluating arguments for and against a document 
belonging to a particular class giving better differentiation between classes. The 
primary difference between BAF-Logic and PAS being that in BAF-Logic, the 
degree of support for the negation of a fact is fully independent of the degree of 
support for the fact. 
Note also that both BAF-Logic and PAS approaches are more stable as we try 
to abstract features across more files within a class. In the inside test PAS 
performs slightly better than BAF-Logic. 
The Outside Test results are shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 Outside Test Results – Reuters  
Again the BAF-Logic and PAS approaches consistently out-perform the simple 
Naïve-Bayes classifier. Interestingly the BAF-Logic classifier performs 
somewhat better than the PAS classifier with unseen documents. It is also more 
stable with increasing degrees of abstraction, and its performance actually gets 
better as more terms are abstracted away, with performance peaking at 12.5% 
abstraction degree. 
5.4.2 Task II – 20 News Groups 
In the second task the classifiers were trained on 19,800 Newsnet articles from 
the standard “20 News Groups” corpus. This corpus is made up of 1,000 
Newsnet articles each from 20 News Groups like comp.os.ms-windows.misc, 
rec.autos, rec.motorcycles, sci.electronics, comp.windows.x, misc.forsale, 
talk.politics.mideast etc. 
The articles in each newsgroup are typically (though not always) unmoderated, 
possibly carrying irrelevant materials, and materials written with a wide range 
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of English proficiency skills, vocabulary and writing styles. This makes it 
difficult to classify a document correctly within the 20 news groups.7 
In this task we consider abstraction degrees of up to just 20%. i.e. a term must 
occur at least τ times in at least 20% of all documents to be considered. At 
higher levels of abstraction too few terms are left in the lexicon to produce 
good classification decisions. This supports our view of the irregular nature of 
Newsnet articles as stated earlier. 
Figure 5.3 below compares the performance of the three classifiers on this task: 

























Figure 5.3 Inside Test Results – 20 Newsgroups 
The BAF-Logic Classifier produces the best results at 0% and 10% degrees of 
abstraction, with PAS performing slightly worse. In all three cases the Naïve 
Bayes Classifier performs poorly. 
Figure 5.4 shows the Outside Test results for the 20 Newsgroups task: 
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Figure 5.4 Outside Test Results – 20 Newsgroups 
Here the BAF-Logic Classifier performs significantly better than either the Naïve 
Bayes or the PAS Classifiers. The BAF-Logic Classifier actually performed slightly 
better when more terms were taken away. PAS and Naïve Bayes however both 
suffered when more terms were removed from the lexicon through a higher abstraction 
degree. 
5.5 Analysis 
In both tasks the performance of the BAF-Logic classifier was similar to that of the 
PAS classifier, but much better than the Naïve Bayes classifier. Its likely that both the 
PAS and BAF-Logic classifiers utilized arguments both for and against classifying a 
document in a  particular class to provide for better classification decisions, whereas 
the Naïve Bayes classifier only utilized scores supporting that a document belongs to a 
particular class.  
It is interesting to note that the BAF-Logic classifier works particularly well with 
unseen data, consistently outperforming both the Naïve Bayes and PAS classifiers. Its 
performance is particularly impressive in the second classification task (20 
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Newsgroups), where the BAF-Logic classifier significantly outperforms both the 
Naïve Bayes and PAS classifiers.  
The PAS and BAF-Logic classifiers are almost identical except for the way the classes 
were scored. In the PAS classifier we took the quasi-support that a document Dunk 
consists of terms tunk0, tunk1, etc.,  belongs to class i with probability p(ti0), p(ti1),… and 
not to other classes j ≠ i with probabilities 1-p(tj0), 1-p(tj1), …. Essentially we are 
assuming that if a term k belongs to some class j with probability p(tjk), then the 
probability that it does not belong to class j is 1 – p(tjk). We are thus taking the 
traditional statistical relationships between the probability of a proposition being true 
and it being not true. 
In the BAF-Logic classifier we instead took the minimum probability of the particular 
term occurring across at least α% of all documents of the class i (α is, as before, our 
degree of abstraction) as our supporting mass ϕTik. This is essentially saying that in 
order for us to say that term k belongs to class i, it must occur in at least α% 
documents in class i. On the other hand we took the maximum probability of the 
particular term k occurring across all other classes j as the refuting mass ϕFik, 
essentially saying that if the term occurs in any other class at all, it just might not 
belong in class i.  
This two sided argument for a term (and hence a document containing the term) 
belonging to a class i appears to have positive results on the classification score. The 
average accuracy scores of BAF-Logic and PAS for the 20 Newsgroups problem is 
summarized in Table 5.1 below, across all three degrees of abstraction (0%, 10% and 
20%): 
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Inside Test Outside Test Overall Method 
Mean (%) Std Dev  Mean (%) Std Dev Mean (%) Std Dev 
BAFL 62.1 32.1 51.7 17.4 56.9 24.3 
PAS 58.9 28.6 39.6 11.0 49.3 19.8 
Table 5.1 BAFL and PAS Accuracy Scores for 20 Newsgroups 
 
BAF-Logic (BAFL) shows an improvement of about 3.2% over PAS for the inside 
test, and a significant 12.1% improvement for the outside test. Overall this works out 
to an average improvement of 7.6%. However PAS appears to be more stable over the 
range of degrees of abstraction, showing a standard deviation of ±28.6 for the Inside 
Test against ±32.1 for BAF-Logic (a difference of ±3.4), ±11.0 for outside test against 
±17.4 for BAF-Logic (difference of ±6.4), and overall PAS has a standard deviation of 
±19.8 against BAF-Logic’s standard deviation of ±24.3 (difference of ±4.5). 
BAF-Logic shows over one standard-deviation of improvement in performance over 
PAS (12.1% against a PAS standard deviation of  ±11.0) for outside testing, suggesting 
that BAFs are a useful and powerful strategy for especially for classifying unseen 
documents. BAF-Logics’s inside-testing performance is less remarkable, but still 
interesting. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we studied the application of BAF-Logic to the text classification 
problem. This chapter then proceeds to formulate BAF-Logic and PAS solutions by 
first modeling the terms in a document as a logical prepositional logic statement.  
Our experiment results support the view that considering both evidences for and 
against a document belonging to a particular class gives better differentiation between 
classes and thus better classification accuracy. 
Belief Augmented Frames 
113 
BAF-Logic goes one step further than PAS by declaring that the masses that support a 
fact and the masses that refute it are completely independent and may be drawn from 
different sources. Our experiment results suggest that this strategy provides for even 
better classification results, in particular for previously unseen documents. 
Our experiment results in this chapter are very promising. More work should be done 
to compare BAF-Logic with other approaches like clustering, neural network 
classifiers, expectation maximization etc. In addition a detailed study of why the BAF-
Logic classifier should be particularly good at classifying previously unseen 
documents should be carried out, especially in relation to the fully independent masses 
supporting and refuting the presence of a term belonging to the class. 
5.7 Contributions of This Chapter 
This chapter presents how BAF-Logic may be applied to classifying text documents. It 
makes the following contributions: 
i) This chapter contributes a framework for rendering the text 
classification problem into Propositional Logic, and from there into a 
BAF-Logic problem. 
ii) This chapter also renders the text classification problem into a PAS 
problem. From these two contributions we drew up the formulation of a 
text classifier based on BAF-Logic and PAS. 
iii) Experiments were performed to show that both PAS and BAF-Logic 
classifiers consistently outperformed the simple Naïve Bayes classifier. 
We conjectured that this is most likely because both the BAF-Logic and 
PAS classifiers consider evidence both for and against a document 
belonging to a particular class, and thus provides for better 
classification decisions. 
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iv) Our experiments also show that BAF-Logic is particularly good at 
classifying new and previously unseen documents. It performs robustly 
even with smaller lexicons, and it consistently outperforms both the 
Naïve-Bayes and PAS classifiers. These results suggest that the strategy 
of explicitly separating masses that support a fact and masses that refute 
it is a sound one. 
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Chapter 6  Summary and Suggestions for Further Work 
In this chapter we recap the important concepts covered by this thesis. We begin first 
with a summary of the entire thesis. We then proceed to outline a growth plan for this 
research. 
6.1 Summary 
We now summarize the work of this entire thesis in this section. 
6.1.1 Existing Uncertain Reasoning Systems 
We began this thesis with a survey of existing multivalued uncertain reasoning 
systems like n-valued Lukasiewicz logic, fuzzy logic, Probabilistic 
Argumentation Systems, Dempster-Shafer Theory and the Transferable Belief 
Model. We presented simple examples to show the application of each of these 
systems. 
Following this we proposed augmenting standard AI knowledge representation 
structures with belief measures. This allows us to not only add structure to 
belief functions, but also to add uncertain reasoning abilities to these structures. 
6.1.2 Belief-Augmented Frames: Basic Principle 
This thesis then introduces the Belief Augmented Frame, or BAF. A BAF is a 
standard AI frame in which frame existence and frame relations are no longer 
considered to be absolute, but instead uncertainty values are assigned to these 
“facts”. Adding uncertainties allow frames to more realistically model the 
world. For example, we may not fully be certain that Pedro owns a donkey, or 
that the donkey even exists at all. This uncertainty cannot be represented by 
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classical frames, but may be modeled as frame existence and frame relation 
uncertainties. 
6.1.3 Uncertainty Measures 
At the outset of this research we rejected traditional probabilities for modeling 
the uncertainties. This is because of restrictions in statistical relationships, and 
the lack of provision for ignorance.  
We decided therefore to use belief measures to model these uncertainties. 
Intuitively for any fact fj we would have a set of other facts that support this 
fact fj, and a second set of facts that refute it. To decide if a fact is true, both 
sides must be evaluated and a conclusion drawn. This leads us to the decision 
to separate the belief masses supporting a fact (i.e. the existence of an object or 
idea represented by the frame, and relations between frames) and those refuting 
it.  
We then proposed a system of logical inference called BAF-Logic based on 
Lukasiewicz/Fuzzy logic style min-max functions, and proved rigorously that 
our reasoning system was conditionally sound. We determined the conditions 
under which the reasoning might become unsound, and proposed solutions to 
deal with these conditions.  
6.1.4 Applications of BAF  
In this thesis we proposed two applications of BAF; discourse understanding 
and text classification. 
6.1.4.1 Discourse Understanding 
We examined a simple example of discourse understanding applying 
BAFs. More interestingly we showed how the uncertainties in the frame 
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existence and frame relations may be applied to model fuzzy 
comparisons like “like somewhat” vs. “like a lot”, “best friend” vs. 
“acquaintance” etc.  While there is nothing new here by way of 
scientific research, this chapter does demonstrate the usefulness of 
having non-absolute relations in frames. 
6.1.4.2 Text Classification 
We proposed a BAF-Logic solution to the text classification problem, 
and compared its performance with a classical  Naïve-Bayes classifier. 
Since Probabilistic Argumentation Systems (PAS) are also quite similar 
to BAF-Logic, we proposed a PAS solution and evaluated the BAF-
Logic classifier against the PAS classifier. 
Both the BAF-Logic and PAS classifiers performed strongly against the 
Naïve-Bayes classifier. We propose that this is due to the BAF-Logic 
and PAS classifiers considering evidence both for and against a 
document belonging to a particular class, and can thus differentiate 
better between classes and make better classification decisions. 
We note with interest too that BAF-Logic performs relatively well with 
unseen documents (i.e. documents that were not used to train the 
classifier). Since the BAF-Logic and PAS classifiers are very similar 
other than the way supporting and disputing belief masses are explicitly 
separated and completely independent of each other in BAF-Logic, the 
BAF-Logic classifier’s relative good performance on unseen data and 
stability with a shrinking lexicon suggest that this is  good approach to 
representing knowledge at least for text classification. 
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We have thus proposed a new approach to modeling knowledge using frames and 
uncertainty, proposed a system for reasoning using these frames, demonstrated how to 
use these Belief Augmented Frames for discourse understanding, and finally 
demonstrated its potential in medium to large text classification tasks. 
6.2 Research Growth Plan 
This thesis introduces Belief Augmented Frames and demonstrates its application in 
discourse understanding and text classification. There are however many issues left 
open by this research; the more interesting issues include: 
6.2.1 Dialog Systems 
The intuitive approach taken by BAFs to understand and integrate knowledge 
will allow us to build powerful interactive systems, especially in the area of 
dialog systems research. We would thus like to study in much greater depth 
how BAFs may be used to improve the performance of dialog systems. 
6.2.2 Natural Language Generation using BAFs 
The semantic network formed by the BAF relations, together with the 
uncertainty values of these relations, may be viewed as a summary of the 
discourse that is represented by the BAFs. Thus it will be useful to study in 
great depth how the semantic networks may be rendered into natural language. 
This would give us a powerful text-summarization tool.  
6.2.3 Automatic Generation of BAFs from Natural Language 
The ability to get computers to understand natural, free flow language is one of 
the holy grails of natural language processing. While it is relatively trivial to 
automatically generate BAFs from a limited set of writing styles and 
Belief Augmented Frames 
119 
vocabulary, the ability to generate BAFs from arbitrary natural language 
sources is a daunting but worthwhile challenge. This will allow us to build 
more powerful and natural user interfaces. 
6.2.4 Automatic Generation of Frame Network 
Research will be carried out into how BAFs may be automatically generated 
using relational information from a thesaurus like WordNet. Such research 
would be useful in producing robust semantic representations of spoken dialog, 
for example. 
6.3  Conclusion 
This thesis proposes Belief Augmented Frames or BAFs as a new and powerful 
knowledge representation system. It proceeds to demonstrate rigorously that BAFs are 
a conditionally sound reasoning system. Two applications are proposed, with a detailed 
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